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Abstract—Cognitive radio networks (CRN s) have emerged
as an essential technology to enable dynamic and opportunistic
spectrum access which aims to exploit underutilized licensed
channels to solve the spectrum scarcity problem. Despite the
great benefits that CRN s offer in terms of their ability to
improve spectrum utilization efficiency, they suffer from user
location privacy issues. Knowing that their whereabouts may
be exposed can discourage users from joining and participating
in the CRN s, thereby potentially hindering the adoption and
deployment of this technology in future generation networks.
The location information leakage issue in the CRN context has
recently started to gain attention from the research community
due to its importance, and several research efforts have been
made to tackle it. However, to the best of our knowledge, none
of these works have tried to identify the vulnerabilities that are
behind this issue or discuss the approaches that could be deployed
to prevent it. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by providing
a comprehensive survey that investigates the various location
privacy risks and threats that may arise from the different
components of this CRN technology, and explores the different
privacy attacks and countermeasure solutions that have been
proposed in the literature to cope with this location privacy
issue. We also discuss some open research problems, related to
this issue, that need to be overcome by the research community
to take advantage of the benefits of this key CRN technology
without having to sacrifice the users’ privacy.
Keywords— Location privacy, cognitive radio networks,
dynamic spectrum access, privacy preserving protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRN s) have been widely
adopted as an efficient way to improve the spectrum uti-
lization efficiency and alleviate the spectrum scarcity crisis
caused by the huge demand on radio frequency resources.
This technology has several applications and is considered as
one of the main enablers for 5G wireless networks to deal
with its stringent spectrum requirement. This paradigm, first
coined by Mitola [1], could be thought of as an intelligent
wireless communication system that is aware of its surround-
ing and that can adapt dynamically to the changes in the
RF environment. It enables dynamic spectrum access (DSA)
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and improves the spectrum utilization efficiency by allowing
unlicensed/secondary users (SU s) to exploit unused spectrum
bands of licensed/primary users (PU s). That is, SU s can
opportunistically use unused spectrum bands (aka spectrum
holes or white spaces), which are defined by FCC as the
channels that are unused at a specific location and time [2], so
long as doing so does not cause harmful interference to PU s.
A. The CRN location privacy problem
Despite its great potential for improving spectrum utilization
efficiency, the CRN technology suffers from serious privacy
and security risks. Although the survey covers location privacy
issues arising at the various CRN components, for motivation
purposes, we focus in this section on the spectrum discovery
component only, in which white spaces are identified using
either the cooperative spectrum sensing or the database-driven
spectrum access functions.
1) Cooperative spectrum sensing
In cooperative sensing, a central entity called Fusion Center
(FC) orchestrates the sensing operations as follows: It selects
one channel for sensing and, through a control channel,
requests that each SU perform local sensing on that channel to
detect the presence of PU signals and send its sensing report
back to it. Fusion Center then combines the received sensing
reports, makes a decision about the channel availability, and
diffuses the decision back to the SU s. Here, a sensing report
is essentially a sensed/measured quantity characterising some
PU signal strength the SU observed on some PU chan-
nel, and what quantity the SU measures depends on the
spectrum sensing method it uses (e.g., waveform [3], energy
detection [4], cyclostationarity [5], etc.; see Section II-A1 for
more details). For example, when using the energy detec-
tion method, the sensed quantity is the energy strength of
the sensed PU signal, often referred to as received signal
strength (RSS) [6].
In cooperative sensing, communications between SU s and
Fusion Center could be done via one of the following: (i)
direct, single-hop wireless links; (ii) multi-hop links (with
first link being wireless); (iii) wired links (whether single
or multiple hops). In the first and second types, location
privacy information can be easily leaked by observing the
wireless radio signals sent by SU s to Fusion Center. In this
case, existing (mostly mature) location privacy preservation
technologies (e.g., see [7], [8] for sensor, [9] for WiFi and [10]
for cellular) can be applied here to protect the location privacy
of SU s during cooperative sensing. In the third communication
type when SU s communicate with Fusion Center via wired
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2links, wireless signal-based localization techniques can no
longer be used here to locate SU s.
However, unlike traditional wireless networks, in the case
of cooperative sensing, preventing leakage of location infor-
mation from wireless signals (e.g., by communicating via
wired links) does not guarantee the preservation of SU s’
location privacy. This is because location information can
also be leaked from the sensing reports sent by SU s to the
Fusion Center during cooperative sensing [11]. Recall that
a sensing report is essentially the received signal strength
(RSS) value of some PU signal that the SU observed on
a specific PU channel. And it has been shown that these
values are highly correlated to the physical location of the
reporting SU [11]. Now Fusion Center may know the actual
physical locations of few PU s as well as the channels these
PU s communicate on, and thus, by knowing the RSS values
measured by an SU on each of these PU channels, Fusion
Center can easily locate the SU . Some illustrative scenarios,
showing how Fusion Center can easily infer the physical
locations of SU s by simply looking at few sensing reports
on different PU channels, are given in [11]. This is also
illustrated in Figure 1(a).
(a) Cooperative sensing (b) DB -driven access
Figure 1: Location privacy issues during spectrum discovery
2) Database-driven access
In database-driven spectrum access, spectrum availability
information is provided to SU s by querying a spectrum
database, often maintained and controlled by a third party (e.g.,
Google, Spectrum Bridge, RadioSoft, etc.). Here, although
SU queries’ final destination is the database, which is often
located far away from the SU s, location information can also
be leaked from wireless radio signals if the SU s’ first hop
is a wireless link; e.g., a cellular base station or a WiFi
access point. In this case, the aforementioned, existing location
privacy preservation techniques that overcome wireless signal-
based leakage can also be applied to protect SU s’ location
privacy. However, as illustrated in Figure 1(b), there is a more
straightforward location privacy threat specific to the database-
driven access method: In order for an SU to acquire spectrum
availability information, it is required to query the database
with its physical location, so that the database can inform
it about spectrum availability in its vicinity. This explicit
exposure of SU s’ location information to third (commercial)
parties raises serious privacy concerns and has some undesired
consequences, as discussed next.
B. Why worry about location information privacy?
Most users will not be okay with having their whereabouts
and private location information made public, especially in the
presence of malicious entities that may be eager to exploit
this information for malicious purposes and to gain more
knowledge about other sensitive and private information. A
survey conducted in 2015 by Pew Research found that ”Most
Americans hold strong views about the importance of privacy
in their everyday lives”, and that ”These feelings also extend
to their wishes that they be able to maintain privacy in
their homes, at work, during social gatherings, at times when
they want to be alone and when they are moving around in
public”(Madden et al. [12]). This same survey also reports
that ”90% say that controlling what information is collected
about them is important” and ”88% say it is important that
they not have someone watch or listen to them without their
permission”. For instance, with an operation as simple as a
succession of database accesses, a database can easily monitor
and track the SU ’s daily life activities and communications,
allowing the database to learn various behavioral information
about the user; e.g., where he/she goes for shopping, which
social circles he/she attends, and where and when he/she
eats. As spectrum databases are being managed by business
entities, such a private information is at the risk of being sold
and shared with other commercial entities. Indeed, a SU ’s
fine-grained location information, when combined with other
publicly available information, could easily be exploited to
infer other personal information about an individual including
his/her behavior, preferences, personal habits or even beliefs.
For instance, an adversary can learn an individual’s religious
belief by observing that a he/she frequently visits places with
religious affiliations. Location traces could also reveal some in-
formation about the health condition of a user if the adversary
observes that the user regularly goes to a hospital for example.
The frequency and duration of these visits can even reveal the
seriousness of a user illness and even the type of illness if the
location corresponds to that of a specialty clinic. The adversary
could sell this health information to pharmaceutical advertisers
without the user’s consent. Moreover, malicious adversaries
with criminal intent could use the location information to pose
a threat to individuals’ security and privacy; for instance, they
can commit crimes of theft and burglary when users are absent.
We envision that the public’s acceptance of the dynamic
and opportunistic spectrum sharing paradigm will greatly
depend on the robustness and trustworthiness of CRN s vis-
a-vis of their ability to address these privacy concerns. It
is, therefore, imperative that techniques and tools to be de-
veloped by the research community for CRN s be enabled
with privacy preserving capabilities that protect the location
privacy of SU s while allowing them to harness the benefits
of the CRN paradigm without disrupting the functionalities
that these techniques are designed for to promote dynamic
spectrum access.
C. Location privacy protection: pros and cons
Ensuring that the location privacy information of SU s
is protected has great benefits. First and most importantly,
it promotes dynamic and opportunistic sharing of spectrum
resources, thereby increasing spectrum utilization efficiency.
Knowing that their location privacy is protected so that they
do not have to worry about their whereabouts being tracked
3TABLE I: Pros and cons of preserving the location privacy of SU s
Pros Cons
SU
- Encourages SU s to participate in the cooperative spectrum sensing
process, and hence in accurately locating spectrum opportunities.
- Discourages SU s from using spectrum opportunities without checking for
availability first, either through spectrum databases or cooperative sensing,
and thus prevents SU s from violating secondary spectrum access policies.
- Promotes dynamic spectrum sharing, and thus increases spectrum utiliza-
tion efficiency and helps address the spectrum supply shortage problem.
- Incurs additional SU s’ communication, computation, and storage over-
heads; this can be problematic when SU s are resource-limited devices
(e.g., IoT devices, sensors, etc.).
- Introduces delay in the process of querying spectrum databases for
spectrum availability information in the case of database-driven CRN ap-
proach.
- Introduces delay when locating and deciding about spectrum availability
through the cooperative spectrum sensing approach.
PU
- Protects PU s from harmful interference that might come from SU s
not willing to check for spectrum availability (either via the cooperative
spectrum sensing approach or database-driven access approach) before
using PU channels.
- Outdated spectrum availability information due to the delays incurred as
a result of protecting the location privacy may lead to the use of occupied
PU channels by SU s, thereby causing interference to PU s.
Figure 2: Survey structure
and their privacy being compromised, SU s will be encouraged
to participate in the cooperative spectrum sensing process,
and to query spectrum databases for spectrum availability.
Ensuring location privacy protection can also be beneficial to
PU s. For example, being concerned that their location privacy
information may be leaked to spectrum databases, SU s may
attempt to use PU channels without registering and querying
spectrum databases for spectrum availability, thereby causing
harmful interference to PU s.
Providing location privacy preservation guarantees cannot,
however, be done without a cost. It does introduce additional
communication, computation and storage overheads, which
may, in turn, also introduce additional delay when it comes
to learning about the availability status of some channel, and
can, in the extreme case, make the spectrum availability in-
formation outdated, thus possibly resulting in using a channel
that is not vacant. The pros and cons of providing location
privacy protection are summarized in Table I.
D. State-of-the art surveys
There have been several existing works that investigate
and address the various CRN vulnerabilities and security is-
sues [13]–[17]. However, most of these survey works focus on
security and privacy issues in general with little or no attention
to the location privacy issue that we address in this survey. For
instance, Mee et al. [15] present an extensive review on the
use of reinforcement learning to achieve security enhancement
in the context of CRN s while dealing with jamming and
byzantine attacks. El-Hajj et al. [16] provide a per-layer
classification of attacks targeting CRN s, and discuss existing
countermeasure solutions that address these attacks. Sharma et
al. [17] discuss security threats, attacks, and countermeasures
in CRN s for both PU s and SU s with focus on the physical
layer. There have also been few surveys that aimed at exploring
location privacy issues, but they are generally not focusing on
CRN s. For instance, Zhang et al. [18] present a high-level
overview of fundamental approaches for user localization and
privacy preservation but mainly in the context of location-
based services (LBS). They also discuss this issue, but only
briefly, in the context of indoor environments, wireless sensor
networks, and cognitive radio networks. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey that digs into
the different privacy threats and attacks that target the location
information of SU s at the different CRN components, along
with the different techniques that have been proposed in the
literature to mitigate and address these threats.
E. Structure and acronyms
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the location
privacy threats and vulnerabilities arising at the various com-
ponents of CRN s, as well as the different techniques proposed
in the literature to overcome these privacy issues. The general
survey structure is depicted in Figure 2, and is as follows:
4• Section II investigates the vulnerabilities and sources
of location information leakage in CRN s, and provides
insights on how these vulnerabilities could become po-
tential threats to SU s’ location privacy.
• Section III explores the privacy enhancing technologies
(PETs) that are most relevant to CRN s. The goal is to
show how these techniques, that are widely adopted in
other contexts, could not be applied off-the-shelf as they
are in the context of CRN s unless judiciously adapted to
the unique requirements of CRN s.
• Sections IV and V discuss threats and attacks that have
been identified in the literature with respect to the spec-
trum opportunity discovery component (Section IV), as
well as other CRN components (Section V). They also
discuss their impacts on SU s’ privacy, and investigate
countermeasure solutions that have been proposed in the
literature to deal with these attacks. These two sections
also explore and present the different metrics used to
assess and evaluate both the achievable performance and
the privacy level of these proposed solutions.
• Section VI discusses unsolved research challenges per-
taining to the location privacy in CRN s, with a special
focus on the CR components that have received the least
attention from the research community. It also discusses
open research problems arising from alternative CRN ar-
chitectures and from emerging CR-based technologies.
• Section VII concludes the survey.
For convenience, we summarize the used acronyms in Table II.
TABLE II: Acronyms
AoA Angle of arrival
BS Base station
CR Cognitive radio
CRN Cognitive radio network
DB Spectrum database
DSA Dynamic spectrum access
FC Fusion center
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GW Gateway
MAC Medium Access Control
MPC Secure multiparty computation
MTP Maximum transmit power
OPE Order preserving encryption
ORAM Oblivious random access memory
OT Oblivious transfer
PET Privacy enhancing technology
PIR Private information retrieval
QoS Quality of service
REM Radio environment map
RSS Received signal strength
SINR Signal to interference-plus-noise ratio
SNR Signal to noise ratio
SP Service provider
SSE Searchable symmetric encryption
SU Secondary user
PU Primary user
ToA Time of arrival
TDoA Time difference of arrival
WSN Wireless sensor network
II. SOURCES OF LOCATION INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN
CRN S
CRN s need to perform a number of spectrum-aware oper-
ations to adapt to the dynamic spectrum environment. These
operations form what is called a cognition cycle [1], [19]–[21],
which mainly consists of four spectrum functions as shown in
Figure 3: Spectrum opportunity discovery, spectrum analysis,
spectrum sharing and spectrum mobility. Despite their merit
in enhancing the spectrum utilization, CRN s may present
some privacy risks to SU s especially in terms of their location
privacy. In this section, we investigate the different aspects of
the cognitive spectrum functions and we discuss the different
threats that can compromise the location privacy of SU s in
CRN s during the execution of these functions.
Figure 3: Cognitive radio cycle [20].
A. Location information leakage in spectrum discovery
This is considered to be one of the most important compo-
nents of the cognition cycle, as it provides information about
spectrum holes and PU s’ presence. Mainly, there are two
approaches to obtain this information: spectrum sensing, to
be performed by SU s [22], and geolocation database. We first
describe these two approaches, and then investigate the sources
of location information leakage that they may have.
1) Spectrum sensing
Spectrum sensing enables SU s to be aware of their sur-
roundings and to be able to identify spectrum holes in their
vicinity so that they can exploit them opportunistically. It
basically requires SU s to sense and detect primary signals
without interfering with PU ’s transmissions [23], [24]. Spec-
trum sensing could be divided into two main functionalities,
PU detection and cooperation, which are detailed next.
a) PU detection
The first step towards discovering spectrum opportunities is
to detect PU s’ signals. To do so, each SU needs to sense its
local radio environment, as it is generally assumed not to have
any prior knowledge about PU s’ activities. We now present
existing techniques that have been proposed in the literature
to detect primary signals.
• Energy detection [4]: This is the simplest and the most
popular approach for signal detection [25]. It is also
considered as the optimal sensing approach when no
information about the primary signal is available [26].
The presence or absence of a PU is decided by measuring
PU signal’s energy (aka the received signal strength
(RSS )) on a target channel and comparing it against a
detection energy threshold λ [6], [27].
5• Matched filter detection [28]: It is considered as the opti-
mal signal detection method [25], [29] as it maximizes the
signal to noise ratio. It requires a full knowledge of PU ’s
signal features such as modulation format, data rate, etc.
It compares the known signal (aka template) with the
input signal to detect the presence of the template signal
in the unknown signal. The output of the matched filter
is then compared to a predetermined threshold to decide
on PU ’s presence or absence.
• Cyclostationary detection [25], [30]: PU s’ transmitted
signals are usually cyclostationary, i.e. their statistics
exhibit periodicity [27]. Such a periodicity is usually
introduced to the primary signals so that receivers can
use it for timing and channel estimation purposes. But
it can also be exploited for detecting PU s [21]. SU s
can detect this periodicity in the modulated signals by
analyzing a spectral correlation function. This spectrum
sensing technique is appealing because of its capability
of differentiating the primary signal from noise and
interference even in very low SNR environments [27].
• Wavelet detection [3], [27]: This method uses wavelet
transform, an attractive mathematical tool used to inves-
tigate signal local regularity to analyze singularities and
irregular structures in the power spectrum density caused
by spectrum usage [21]. Wavelets are used for detecting
edges, which are boundaries between spectrum holes and
occupied bands, in the power spectral density (PSD) of
a wideband channel.
Most of the above mentioned techniques are based on a
set of measurements sampled at the Nyquist rate and can
sense only one band at a time because of the hardware limita-
tions [31]. In addition, sensing a wideband spectrum requires
dividing it into narrow bands and making SU sense each band
using multiple RF frontends simultaneously [31]. This may
result in a very high processing time and hardware cost which
makes these approaches not suitable for wideband sensing.
Compressive sensing [32] is proposed to overcome these
issues. In compressive sensing theory, a sparse signal can be
acquired and compressed simultaneously in the same process
with only the essential information at rates significantly lower
than Nyquist rate. This means that the signal can be recovered
from far fewer measurements and at a lower rate (below
Nyquist rate) compared to that of traditional methods [31],
[33]. As the wideband spectrum is inherently sparse due to
its low spectrum utilization, compressive sensing becomes a
promising approach to realize wideband spectrum sensing.
b) Cooperation
One widely adopted approach for improving spectrum sens-
ing accuracy is cooperation, where SU s share their local
sensing observations and collaboratively make spectrum avail-
ability decisions. These observations can be made using one
of PU detection techniques discussed in Section II-A1a.
The idea behind cooperation is to exploit spatial diversity
of spatially distributed SU s to cope with problems, like
shadowing, multipath fading, and receiver uncertainty, that
may impact individual local observations of SU s [22]. There
have been many cooperative approaches proposed in the
literature [25], [34]–[37], and cooperative spectrum sensing
has been widely adopted in many cognitive radio standards,
e.g. WhiteFi [38], IEEE 802.22 WRAN [39] and IEEE
802.11af [40]. The collaboration between SU s is usually
performed through a control channel [29] and could be realized
in two major ways: centralized and distributed [41].
In the centralized approach a central entity, referred to as
fusion center (FC ), orchestrates the cooperative sensing task
among SU s through a control channel as shown in Figure 4(a).
FC collects the local observations from SU s and combines
them to determine PU ’s presence on a specific channel.
In the distributed approach, SU s do not rely on FC for
making channel availability decisions. They instead exchange
sensing information among one another to come to a unified
decision [41], [42] as shown in Figure 4(b)
(a) Centralized (b) Distributed
Figure 4: Cooperative spectrum sensing
Another promising approach for enabling effective coopera-
tive spectrum sensing over a large geographic area is to exploit
the emerging crowdsourcing paradigm, in which spectrum ser-
vice providers outsource spectrum sensing tasks to distributed
mobile users [6], [43]–[46]. Crowdsourcing is formally defined
as the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a desig-
nated agent and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large
group of people in the form of an open call. This concept has
been adopted in many contexts [47], and has been first applied
to CRN s by Fatemiah et al. [43].
The use of crowdsourcing for enabling spectrum sensing
is motivated by several facts and trends. First, according to
a recent Cisco report [48], the number of mobile-connected
devices is expected to hit 11.6 billion. This huge number
guarantees sufficient geographic coverage, especially in highly
populated regions such as metropolitan areas [44] where
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) systems are expected to
play important roles [46]. Moreover, future mobile devices
are widely expected to be able to perform spectrum sensing
tasks given the expected pervasiveness of DSA future wireless
systems [44], [49]. Finally, mobile devices are increasingly
equipped with more powerful communication and computation
resources, and are enabled with self-localization capabilities,
making mobile crowdsourcing even more appealing and at-
tractive [46].
The cooperative spectrum sensing process is usually per-
formed by a specified set of nodes that are considered to be
trustworthy [43]. Crowdsourcing-based cooperative spectrum
sensing, on the other hand, is to be realized by gathering and
combining sensing reports from a large group of nodes that
could be unreliable, untrustworthy, or even malicious [43],
thereby giving rise to new challenges.
6Another important challenge that arises from SU s’ coop-
eration nature is how to combine the various SU s’ sensing
results or observations for hypothesis testing to decide on
the presence of primary signals in an accurate manner. This
process consists of sending the sensing results to FC or to
the neighboring SU s, depending on the topology, to make
spectrum availability decisions. It is referred to as data fusion
and can be done in one of two ways: soft combining and
hard combining [50]. In soft combining, local sensing reports,
measured locally by SU s from their received signals, are
combined together to compute some statistics using combining
rules such as square law combining (SLC), maximal ratio
combining (MRC) and selection combining (SC) [50]. In
hard combining, SU s make decisions about the availability
of the spectrum locally, and share their one-bit decision (i.e.,
available or not available) outputs to make a voting decision
about spectrum availability [50].
2) Geolocation database
This is another approach for spectrum opportunity discovery
that was recommended recently by FCC [51]. A typical
database-driven CRN [52], [53] consists of a geolocation
database (DB ) containing spectrum availability information,
a set of SU s and a set of PU s as shown in Figure 5(a).
To learn about spectrum opportunities in its vicinity, a SU is
not required to detect the primary signal by itself anymore.
Instead, it needs to query DB by including its exact location
in the query. DB then replies with a set of available chan-
nels in SU ’s location and with the appropriate transmission
parameters (e.g. transmit power) for each channel to avoid
interfering with the incumbents. Afterwards, depending on the
situation, SU may optionally inform DB of its choice and
registers the channel it is planning to operate on during what
is referred to as notification or commitment phase [54], [55].
DB keeps track of this information to have more visibility
over the CRN and make its decision adaptively which allows
it to reduce interference among SU s. SU s may be able to
communicate directly with DB as in Figure 5(a) or via a fixed
base station that relays their queries to DB as in Figure 5(b).
(a) without BS (b) with BS
Figure 5: Spectrum database-based CRN topologies
3) Sources of location information leakage
In this Section, we investigate the different vulnerabilities in
the spectrum opportunities discovery phase and the potential
threats that could exploit them in order to localize SU s.
We first begin by exploring the sources of leakage in the
cooperative spectrum sensing approach, and then we explore
those in the database-based approach.
a) Cooperative spectrum sensing
In the cooperative spectrum sensing approach, SU s need to
communicate with other entities in the CRN to exchange and
share their observations of the spectrum. This collaboration
may lead to a significant leakage of information regarding
the location of the collaborating SU s. In the following, we
investigate and discuss the different vulnerabilities that arise
from the cooperation process.
Wireless signal: This is the most obvious and direct source
of leakage in wireless networks in general and in CRN s
in particular. The wireless medium and its inherent open
and broadcast nature in CRN s makes it much easier for an
attacker to compromise a SU ’s privacy and more specifically
its location [56], [57]. Despite the many efforts to protect the
private location information at the system level, mainly using
encrypted signal transmissions, the signal itself can still be
used to potentially localize a SU . Classic approaches for lo-
calization are usually based on a small set of measurements on
the wireless signals, that include time-based ranging, received
signal strength (RSS ) and angle of arrival (AoA) [56].
• Time-based ranging: This is used to estimate the distance
between two communicating nodes by measuring the sig-
nal propagation delay, known also as time-of-flight, τF =
d/c, where d is the actual distance between the nodes and
c is the propagation speed (c ' 3.108m/s) [57]. This
can be accomplished using either time-of-arrival (ToA)
or time difference-of-arrival (TDoA). If at time t1 the
victim node sends a packet that contains the timestamp
t1 to a semi-honest or malicious node that receives it at
time t2, then the latter node can estimate the distance that
separates it from the victim node based on τF = t1− t2.
This technique is known as ToA ranging [56], [57].
ToA needs at least three measurements of distance to
localize the target via triangulation [58], which means
that a malicious entity cannot localize precisely a target
SU unless it is mobile or it collaborates with two other
malicious entities. TDoA, on the other hand, does not
rely on the absolute distance between a pair of nodes
but rather on the measurement of the difference in time
between signals arriving at two base nodes.
• Received signal strength (RSS )-based ranging: In theory,
the energy of a radio signal decreases with the square
of the distance from the signal’s source. As a result, a
node listening to a radio transmission should be able to
use the strength of the received signal to estimate its
distance from the transmitter [59]. More details about
the practicality of RSS -based ranging technique and its
feasibility given various factors could be found in [60].
• Angle of arrival (AoA)-based ranging: AoA could be
defined as the angle between the propagation direction
of an incident wave and some reference direction known
as orientation [61]. The estimation of AoA could be done
using directive antennas or using an array of uniformly
separated receivers [62]. The relative angle could then be
used to derive the distance between the two communicat-
ing nodes [59].
Observations: The spectrum sensing measurements and
7observations that SU s share to identify spectrum holes may be
another source of location information leakage in CRN s. In
the case of soft combining rule where SU s have to share their
raw measurements, SU s may see their location information
exposed. Indeed, it has been shown in [6], [11] that the sensing
reports containing RSS measurements on PU s’ signal, are
highly correlated to SU s’ physical location. The RSS mea-
surements could be used to localize SU s with respect to PU s
whose channels are sensed through these measurements. Note
that this RSS is different from the RSS that we discussed
previously for wireless signal which are obtained through a
direct communication through the wireless medium between
the adversary and the target victim. If the CRN uses a hard
combining rule for the cooperative sensing, SU s need just to
share their binary decision values. This can still leak some
information about SU s’ location as it can tell whether a
SU belongs to the coverage area of a PU especially if the
activity of PU is known by the attacker.
Identity: One cannot talk about a location information
leakage if the identity of the target victim is not revealed.
Therefore, the identity of the user could also be considered
as a source of location information leakage in the way that
an attacker can match this identity to a specific location. In
other words, if an attacker learns that a SU is located at a
specific location but at the same time fails to identify who
it is, the location privacy of SU cannot be considered as
compromised. So, as long as a SU is anonymous, its location
privacy is preserved. In some cases, identity could also give
an idea about the location of a SU if combined with publicly
known information of this specific SU . Take the example of a
user whose identity is revealed. Based on this information, an
adversary can learn the profession of this user, for instance a
doctor that works at a specific hospital. This allows an attacker
to estimate the position of the target SU with high probability
especially during regular working hours. This shows that the
identity could be associated with a specific location of a SU .
Radio hop count: The sensing information needs to be
delivered to the appropriate nodes for the final decision, espe-
cially in multi-hop CRN s which requires deploying efficient
routing protocols. These routing protocols usually rely on
hop count information [63], [64], and such information turns
out to be another potential source of location information
leakage [59]. Many approaches are proposed in the literature,
especially in the context of wireless sensor networks, to
estimate node position based on the number of hops between
pairs of nodes [65], [66].
Clustered network: SU s may need to form or join dif-
ferent clusters during the spectrum sensing phase in order
to improve the overall sensing performance and overhead.
Different approaches are proposed in the literature for cluster
formation in CRN s based on several criteria and metrics
including geographical location, channel availability, signal
strength and channel quality [67]. This clustering could leak
information about SU s’ location especially if the clustering
criteria is based on the positions of SU s or on some infor-
mation correlated to this position. Chang et al. [68] show that
the clustering information along with some knowledge of the
position of some anchor nodes in wireless sensor networks
can lead to localizing the remaining nodes in the network.
The same idea could be exploited in the context of CRN s in
case, for example, that some SU s are compromised and their
location is known to the adversary. In that case, the adversary
can localize the remaining SU s. Moreover, if the clusters are
also overlapping, this could further facilitate localization as
shown by Youssef et al. in [69].
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR): SU s may need to share their
measured SNRs, with respect to the channels of interest, with
other SU s to cooperate in forming coalitions and selecting the
decision making nodes in ad hoc CRN s [70]. The average
SNR of PU ’s received signal measured at SU i is given by:
SNRi,PU =
PPU · κ
dαPU ,i · σ2
(1)
with PPU is the transmission power of PU , σ2 denotes the
Gaussian noise variance, κ is a path loss constant, α is the
path loss exponent and dPU ,i is the distance between PU and
SU i [71]. As Equation (1) shows, the SNR value measured
by a SU depends on the distance that separates it from the
corresponding PU . This could present a source of location
information leakage as this information could be exploited to
localize SU especially when it has to share its SNR with other
SU s in the same coalition [72].
The vulnerabilities and sources of leakage that we have
raised previously could lead to serious location privacy risks
for SU s if exploited by malicious entities in the CRN . This
leakage could happen in the following scenarios:
• Cooperation and sharing observations: In order to
participate in the cooperation for spectrum sensing, SU s
need to share their observations of the spectrum either
with other SU s or with a central entity. Despite the fact
that sharing this information considerably improves the
spectrum sensing performance, it exposes, however, indi-
vidual SU s observations to other entities in the network.
This becomes problematic if, during the sharing process,
an external or internal malicious entity to the network
gains access to these observations. This is due to the fact
that these observations could be exploited to compromise
SU s’ location privacy as discussed earlier.
• Dynamism: Due to the dynamic nature of CRN s, SU s
can leave or join the collaborative spectrum sensing
task at anytime, making privacy-preserving aggregation
techniques designed for static networks to hide individual
observations of SU s unsuitable for CRN s. Indeed, this
might allow a malicious entity that is collecting aggre-
gated observations from SU s to estimate individual ob-
servations of leaving or joining SU s which, as discussed
previously, is a source of location information leakage.
• Node failure: The location privacy issue here is very
similar to the situation of network dynamism. Indeed, if,
for some reason, some SU s cannot sense the spectrum or
fail to share their sensing reports during the cooperation
process, the individual observations of these SU s could
be estimated. Again, these individual observations could
be exploited by an adversary for localization purposes.
• User selection: User selection is an important step in
cooperative spectrum sensing, which aims to optimally
8select the cooperating SU s that lead to the maximization
of the cooperative gain and the minimization of the
cooperation overhead. SU s are selected such that all
the sensing reports are informative and not correlated
while saving energy by avoiding unnecessary sensing
operations [41]. This selection could be done through
a clustering approach that divides SU s into different
clusters. Malady et al. [73] propose several approaches
for grouping SU s into clusters in distributed CRN s to
keep bandwidth and power requirements manageable.
Their methods are based on different criteria including
SU s’ positions with respect to a given reference or to
PU if PU ’s position is known. In [74], Ding et al.
propose a decentralized clustering-based user selection
algorithm that relies on unsupervised learning to group
SU s with best detection performance together to lead the
sensing process. As discussed previously, the clustering
information could be exploited to localize SU s during
the cooperative spectrum sensing process. Another way
for selecting SU s for spectrum sensing, which has just
started to gain some interest in the context of CRN s,
is crowdsourcing as we have explained earlier. Crowd-
sourcing may, however, give rise to some privacy risks,
especially in terms of location privacy as shown by Jin
et al. [46]. The selection process in this case relies on an
open call, made by FC , for users in order to contribute
to the sensing at a specific location. This makes it easy
for FC to associate users with the location of interest.
b) Geolocation database
With this architecture, SU s are not anymore required to
perform spectrum sensing to learn about spectrum opportuni-
ties. Instead, they only need to query a geolocation spectrum
database to get the list of available channels in their vicin-
ity. This brings new privacy challenges that are completely
different from the ones that emerge from the cooperation in
spectrum sensing. In the following, we investigate the different
sources of location information leakage that may arise from
this specific CRN architecture.
Query: This is the most implicit source of location informa-
tion, as every SU needs to include its precise location every
time it queries DB for available channels. This information
is usually sent in a plaintext form, allowing eavesdroppers to
retrieve it. And even if the communication channel between
SU s and DB is authenticated; i.e. it eliminates the risk of an
eavesdropper, there is still the risk of having a malicious DB .
List of available channels in the query’s response: This
information could also be used by an adversary to narrow
down the locations where a target SU might possibly be.
Indeed, knowing which channels are available for a certain
SU allows a malicious entity to attribute this SU to multiple
PU s coverage areas especially if the adversary, DB for
example, is aware of these PU s’ activities and status.
Maximum transmit power (MTP ): The MTP over
a specific spectrum band is included in DB ’s response to
SU , and is assigned to it based on its distance from its
corresponding PU . It is usually calculated as follows
P =
{
0, d ≤ r0
h(d− r0), d > r0
(2)
where d is the distance between the querying SU and its
closest PU , r0 is the protected contour radius of the channel
of interest and h(.) is a continuous, monotonically increasing
function. As shown in Equation (2), MTP is highly correlated
to the distance of SU from PU . In situations where PU s’
positions are publicly known, an attacker could exploit MTP
values that SU s receive from DB to infer SU s’ locations.
These vulnerabilities and sources of leakage could become
actual threats when exploited solely or combined together, and
can occur in the following scenarios:
• Querying DB: When a SU interacts with DB to learn
about spectrum availability, its location can easily be
revealed as it is included in the query. Even if, somehow,
a privacy-preserving scheme is implemented to make
DB unable to retrieve SU ’s location information from
its query but at the same time can still provide it with
the spectrum availability information at its vicinity, an
adversary can still localize SU by exploiting the infor-
mation included in DB ’s response as we discuss next.
• DB’s response: DB ’s response to a SU ’s query includes
information like the list of available channels, and the
maximum transmit power over each of those channels.
This information could be used as explained earlier by
a malicious DB or an external adversary to infer the
location of a target SU .
• Commitment phase: Some implementations of the
database-based CRN s require that a SU , upon receiving
the response from DB , informs DB about the channel
that it chooses to operate on. This will make SU ’s
usage information available at least to DB . Hence, SU s
in database-based CRN s will be prone to attacks that
could exploit the vulnerabilities arising from spectrum
utilization information as we explain in Section II-D2.
B. Location information leakage in spectrum analysis
This is an important step in the cognition cycle as it allows
to analyze the information obtained from spectrum sensing
to gain knowledge about spectrum holes (e.g. interference
estimation, and duration of availability). Spectrum analysis
usually consists of two major components: spectrum charac-
terization, and reconfiguration. In this section, we explain each
of these two components and discuss their sources of location
information leakage.
1) Spectrum characterization
Available spectrum bands may have different channel char-
acteristics that vary over time. In order to determine the
most suitable spectrum band, one needs to characterize these
channels. Such a characterization requires the monitoring and
observation of the RF environment, as well as the monitoring
and awareness of PU s activities in these channels [75].
a) RF environment characterization
This process estimates some of the following key parameters
to characterize the different spectrum bands.
9• Interference: It is crucial to estimate and model the inter-
ference caused by SU s at the primary receiver to derive
the permissible power of a SU and ensure coexistence
between SU s and PU s. Rabbachin et al. [76] propose
a statistical model for aggregate interference generated
by SU s in a limited or finite region by taking into
consideration the shape of the region and the position
of PU . The interference signal at PU generated by the
ith SU is modeled as [76]:
Ii =
√
PIR
−b
i Xi (3)
where PI is the interference power at the near-far region
limit; Ri is the distance between the ith SU and PU ;
and Xi is the per-dimension fading channel path gain of
the channel from the ith SU to PU .
• Path loss: This is closely related to distance and fre-
quency. Path loss increases as the operating frequency
increases, resulting in a decrease in the transmission
range. Increasing the transmission power may be used
to compensate for the increased path loss, and hence for
the decrease in transmission range. But this may increase
interference at other SU s and PU s. According to [77],
the average path loss of a channel could be expressed
using a path loss exponent α. This exponent measures
the rate at which the RSS decreases with distance, and
its value depends on the specific propagation environ-
ment [78]. It is also considered as a key parameter in the
distance estimation based localization algorithms, where
distance is estimated from the RSS [79].
• Channel switching delay: This is basically the delay
introduced by switching from one channel to another.
In CRN s, the channel switching could be triggered by
several events, such as the detection of PU s, the return of
PU s to their channels, and/or the degradation of received
QoS in the current channel, as we discuss in Section II-D.
• Channel holding time: It is the expected duration SU s
can occupy a licensed channel before getting interrupted.
• Channel error rate: This is defined as the rate of data
elements incorrectly received from the total number of
data elements sent during a time interval. This rate
may vary depending on the modulation scheme and the
interference level of the channel [75].
b) PU activity modeling
As spectrum availability depends not only on the RF en-
vironment characteristics but also on the activities of PU s,
it is crucial that PU activities are taken into account when
characterizing the spectrum bands. This is essentially done
by accounting for how long and how often PU s appear on
their licensed spectrum bands. Existing approaches adopted for
modeling this activity mainly rely on measured data obtained
from the numerous spectrum measurement campaigns that
have been conducted worldwide to quantify and study the
PU spectrum utilization and assess the current status of the
spectrum [80]–[82]. These measurements are also performed
to improve the accuracy of spectrum databases. Many of these
works consider only simple but important statistics of the
spectrum occupancy, such as the maximum or the minimum
and the average of power levels, the spectrum occupancy, and
the duty cycle [80]. These statistics are simple and reliable,
but provide an incomplete model of the PU s’ activities.
Other approaches consider more advanced statistical models,
such as probability function models (e.g. CDF and PDF),
Markov chains and linear regressions. These measurement-
based modeling methods describe the statistical behaviors of
the spectrum occupancy as a whole, but do not give the actual
state of the spectrum occupancy, i.e. whether a channel is busy
or available.
Some other significant research models the PU activity
as a Poisson process with exponentially distributed inter-
arrivals [81], [83]. However, such approaches fail to capture
the short-term temporal fluctuations or variations exhibited
by the PU activity, and do not consider correlations and
similarities within the monitored data [81].
There are also approaches that try to predict future PU ac-
tivities and thus locate future spectrum opportunities by using
learning techniques and by exploiting the history of spectrum
band usage [75], [81]. However, the prediction may go wrong
resulting in harmful interference to PU s.
c) Sources of location information leakage
As mentioned earlier, spectrum characterization consists of
building knowledge about the radio environment and PU ac-
tivities. This knowledge, however, could be exploited (ma-
liciously or un-maliciously) to leak location information of
SU s, as discussed next.
Interference: As shown in Equation (3), the interference
is highly correlated to the distance that separates SU from
a PU . An adversary that has access to the characteristics of
the interference caused by SU s can exploit this information
to estimate the distance that separates SU from a PU .
Radio environment map (REM ): This is a widely used
method to characterize the spectrum. It is an integrated
database that could be deployed in CRN s to store information
about the radio environment’s interference, signal properties,
geographical features, spectral regulations, locations and ac-
tivities of radios, policies of SU s and/or service providers,
and past experiences [84], [85]. The main functionality of a
REM is the construction of dynamic interference map for
each frequency at each location of interest. This could be done
in two different ways, either via field measurements or via
propagation modeling. In the first approach, a REM collects
spectrum measurements from nodes with spectrum sensing
capabilities. These nodes could be actual SU s or dedicated
spectrum sensors [86]. Since it is impractical to have mea-
surements all the time at all possible locations, REM fuses
the collected measurements to estimate the interference level
at locations with no measurement data by means of spatial and
temporal interpolation [86]. The field measurement approach
is believed to provide the highest location accuracy but not
without a price. Its price lies in the need to perform drive
tests whenever changes occur in the radio environment to
keep the REM up to date. The second approach, propagation
modeling, relies on mathematical models for radio propagation
prediction, which allow easy, fast and inexpensive updating
for the REM . Indeed, whenever there is a change in the radio
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environment, we only need to rerun the propagation models
with the new parameters to update the REM [56].
This is different from the spectrum geolocation database
in that REM generates spectrum map by processing the data
collected from multiple sources with its cognitive engine, and
therefore can easily adapt to dynamic operating environments
whereas DB stores quasi-static information. REM introduces
environment awareness that would be harder to acquire by
individual CR capabilities via extensive spectrum analysis.
Hence, REM can also be seen as the network support turning
simple nodes into intelligent ones [86].
This radio map, when it is in the hands of some mali-
cious entity in the network, could be exploited to localize a
querying SU that sends its measurement to the REM manager
in order to learn about spectrum availability. One way to
exploit this information is based on fingerprinting localization
technique which basically estimates the target position by
simply finding the best-matched pattern or fingerprint for the
measurement provided by SU within a certain map [56].
Machine learning techniques could be used to build the radio
signal map during the training phase and then to compare the
online measured RSS to the preconstructed map during the
localization phase [56]. Obviously the map that could be used
for the localization is the REM itself. As the REM could be
used in a distributed or a centralized manner, either a malicious
BS or a malicious SU could exploit it to localize a target SU .
2) Reconfiguration
After the channel of choice has been characterized, SU ’s
transceiver parameters have to be reconfigured to adapt to
channel conditions and satisfy the QoS requirements and
regulatory policies. These parameters include:
• Transmission power: Controlling this parameter aims to
achieve several objectives that include minimizing energy
usage, reducing co-channel interference, etc. [87], [88].
• Operating frequency: This parameter represents the ca-
pability of SU s to reconfigure their central frequency in
response to variations in the RF environment.
• Channel bandwidth: This refers to the width of the
spectrum over which a SU operates. It is essential for
SU s to have variable channel adaptation capabilities to
be able to operate in heterogeneous networks.
• Communication technology: This allows interoperability
between different communication technologies such as
GSM, LTE, etc.
Sources of location information leakage: Some of the
reconfigurable parameters that we have listed could leak some
information about SU s’ location especially if these parameters
are controlled in a shared way.
• Power control: This process may present a threat to SU s’
location privacy. Most of the existing approaches for
power control rely on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) metric
when solving the power control problem [88]–[91]. For
example, Hoven et al. [88] use local SNRs of primary sig-
nals measured by SU s as a metric to design an effective
power control rule. Other works use SINR as a constraint
or a requirement to minimize the total transmission power
of the CRN as in [89] and maximize the spectrum
utilization of the CRN as in [92]. Yang et al. [93] model
this problem as a game with SINR-based utility function.
Power control might become threatening to the privacy of
SU s as information like SNR and SINR is usually corre-
lated to the distance that separates a SU from a PU . This
is problematic especially when the power control process
is intended to achieve a system-level goal like minimizing
the total transmission power [89] or maximizing the
overall spectrum utilization [92] of CRN s. In that case,
power control will have to be performed jointly between
SU s in a centralized [89], [94] or distributed [89], [92]–
[94] way, thereby exposing local SNR and SINR values,
for example, to other CRN entities or intruders, putting
SU s’ location information at risk.
C. Location information leakage in spectrum sharing
Multiple SU s may try to access the same spectrum bands
at the same time, thus necessitating multiple-access coordina-
tion mechanisms that allow multiple SU s to share the same
spectrum [95]. Spectrum sharing consists then of enabling
coexistence of multiple SU s while avoiding interference
(among SU s themselves as well as between SU s and PU s)
and maintaining some target QoS levels. Broadly speaking,
this functionality is composed of three elements: resource
allocation, spectrum access and spectrum trading.
1) Resource allocation
Enabling dynamic spectrum sharing is crucial to the success
of CRN s. It allows users to select, use, and share spectrum
bands adaptively with the aim of maximizing the overall
spectrum utilization efficiency while not causing harmful
interference to legacy users [87], [96]–[99]. In this section, we
discuss two resource allocation functions: spectrum selection
and assignment and power control and beamforming.
a) Spectrum selection and assignment
Once the spectrum holes are analyzed and characterized, the
most suitable channel is selected based on QoS requirements
of SU s, as well the characteristics of the channels [87],
[98], [100]. Several criteria may be taken into account while
assigning spectrum bands to SU s. These include minimizing
interference to PU s, maximizing overall spectrum efficiency,
maximizing SU s’ throughput, minimizing network delay, and
increasing network connectivity, just to name a few [87],
[101]. Spectrum assignment could be done in a centralized
or a distributed way, and there have been many proposed
approaches, both centralized and distributed, that address the
spectrum assignment and selection problem in CRN s [87],
[96], [102]–[107]. Generally speaking, these approaches are
mainly based on one of the four mature concepts: graph
theory, game theory, learning and adaptation, and optimization
theory. Next, we explore these four concepts and investigate
the sources of location information leakage that may arise from
using them.
i) Graph theory: Graph theory has been extensively
used to address the spectrum assignment problem especially
when the structure of the CRN is assumed to be known a
priori [87]. Here the network is modeled as a graph, where
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the vertices usually represent SU s and the edges model the
connection between these SU s. To solve the graph-based
spectrum assignment problem, network conflict graphs and
graph coloring are widely used [87].
• Network conflict graph: This models and captures the
interference among SU s caused by concurrent transmis-
sions of nearby SU s communicating on the same or
neighboring channels [87]. The vertices of the graph
represent the communication links among SU s, whereas
the edges represent the pairs of links whose concur-
rent communications interfere with one another when
assigned the same or adjacent spectrum bands [87], [98],
[108]. Conflict graphs are mostly used in centralized
topologies, where a central entity (BS or FC ) constructs
the graph and uses it to assign channels among SU s.
• Graph coloring: In this approach, the CRN is mapped to
a graph that could be either unidirectional or bidirectional
depending on the algorithm’s characteristics. The vertices
in this graph represent SU s that need to share the
spectrum, and the edges model the interference between
SU s. PU s could also be included in the graph with pre-
assigned colors. The spectrum assignment problem using
graph coloring is equivalent to coloring each vertex (or
edge) using different colors from a specific set of colors,
each often representing an available spectrum band [87],
[98], [109]. The goal is to improve spectrum efficiency
by increasing frequency reuse while meeting interference
constraints by ensuring that two connected vertices (SU s)
cannot be assigned the same color, i.e. the same band.
Sources of location information leakage: We identify
two main sources of leakage that arise from graph-based ap-
proaches during the spectrum selection process: the topology
and the connectivity information.
• Topology: The topology of the network that could be
learned via the graph-based spectrum assignment tech-
niques could be explored to infer SU s’ location. In fact,
some works have already used this information to localize
nodes in wireless sensor networks [110], [111].
• Connectivity: This information basically tells which
nodes are located within each other’s transmission range
(i.e., connected to one another). Many approaches have
used this information for positioning purposes [112]–
[115] and some of them can be used to localize target
nodes even from connectivity information among the
nodes themselves only [112], [113].
ii) Game theory: Game theory has also been exten-
sively used to solve the spectrum assignment problem in
CRN s [96], [104], [116]. A game could be seen as a way
of interaction between multiple players competing with each
other while trying to adjust their strategies to optimize their
utilities [21]. Game theory is suitable for the spectrum assign-
ment problem in CRN s as the spectrum allocation decision
of one SU has a direct impact on the performance of other
neighboring SU s [87].
Spectrum selection games in CRN s usually consist of
three components: The players which represent SU s and may
include PU s, the action space and the utility function(s). The
players have a set of functions representing available frequency
bands. The action space is the Cartesian product of the sets of
actions of all players. Each player has a utility function that
is used to translate the action space into the real world needs,
e.g. the frequency bands that meet SU ’s requirements [87].
The goal of the game is to maximize each SU ’s utility
function. This takes into consideration the impact of each
SU ’s decisions on the other players. For games with specific
characteristics, there is always a steady state solution (i.e., a
Nash equilibrium), and any unilateral change of a player leads
to a lower utility for that specific player [87], [116].
Sources of location information leakage: Games may
require that SU s share their channel selection decisions among
one another. This information, just like the case of spectrum
availability, could be used for SU localization. In fact, this
information reveals the list of channels that a SU may be
interested in using; i.e. the list of available channels in its
vicinity. Sharing this list with other SU s may put into risk
SU ’s own privacy, as this information could be used by an
adversary to estimate its position especially if this adversary
has a global knowledge of the CRN .
iii) Learning and adaptation: CRN s employ software-
defined radios, which are capable of executing complex com-
putational tasks through a specialized software module called
the cognitive engine [105], [117]. This engine has learning ca-
pabilities that allow SU s to make spectrum selection decisions
and perform tasks in a distributed manner by only relying on
what SU s learn from the environment [105], [118]. This is
usually done by means of machine learning techniques, which
have recently attracted significant attention in the context of
CRN s [119]–[121]. For example, in [122], the authors propose
a cognitive engine based on artificial neural network (ANN)
that learns how environmental measurements and the status
of the network affect the CRN performance on different
channels. Based on this, the cognitive engine can dynamically
select the best channel, expected to yield the best perfor-
mance for SU s. Li et al. [123] use a multi-agent Q-learning
approach, a model-free type of reinforcement learning, to
address the problem of channel selection in multi-user and
multi-channel CRN s. Each SU considers both the channel
and the other SU s as its environment, updates its Q values
continuously, and uses the Q-table to select the best channel.
NoroozOliaee et al. [119], [124] derive new private objective
functions suitable for supporting elastic traffic that can be
used by learning algorithms to enable cognitive users to locate
and exploit unused spectrum opportunities in a distributed
manner while maximizing their received throughput. These
same authors also derive learning-based objective functions for
the inelastic traffic model with non-cooperative [125], [126]
and cooperative [127], [128] users. Yau et al. [129] propose
a context-aware and intelligent dynamic channel selection
scheme that enables SU s to adaptively select channels for
data transmission to enhance QoS.
Sources of location information leakage: The learning
process may also lead to some location information leakage.
This is mainly due to:
• Environmental measurements: In centralized CRN s, the
learning agent, usually FC , needs to collect environ-
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mental measurements during the training phase [122] to
be able to select the best channels for secondary trans-
missions. In the case of distributed CRN s, the learning
process involves multiple agents, which often need to
exchange measurement information among themselves.
As we have shown previously, this information, when
shared among the different CRN entities, may reveal
significant information about SU s’ location.
• Activity prediction: Prediction strategies through machine
learning techniques could also be used to predict both
PU and SU activities based on past measurements and
experience [130], [131]. This can allow a malicious entity
to predict which channels a SU might be using in the
future. Combining this information with the learned ac-
tivity model of PU s and their coverage areas, it becomes
possible to predict a SU ’s location, just as explained in
Section II-D2.
iv) Optimization theory: Optimization techniques (e.g.,
convex optimization, linear programming, non-linear program-
ming, etc.) have also been widely used to solve the spec-
trum assignment problem in CRN s. For instance, Tan et
al. [107] formulate the channel assignment problem as an
integer optimization with the aim to maximize throughput,
and propose two greedy non-overlapping and overlapping
channel assignment algorithms to solve it. Bkassini et al. [132]
model the channel assignment problem as a weighted bipartite
graph, where PU s and SU s constitute the two disjoint sets of
vertices in the bipartite graph. The authors use the well-known
Hungarian method [133] to solve this problem in polynomial
time. Ding et al. [134] formulate the joint spectrum and power
allocation problem as a convex optimization problem, and
propose a distributed algorithm to solve it. Ben Ghorbel et
al. [135], [136] propose two-phase optimization heuristics also
for joint allocation of the spectrum and power resources. Their
proposed heuristics split the spectrum and power allocation
problem into two sub-problems, and solve each of them
separately. The spectrum allocation problem is solved during
the first phase using learning, whereas the power allocation
is formulated as a real optimization problem and solved,
during the second phase, by traditional optimization solvers.
Salameh et al. [137] formulate the joint rate/power control and
channel assignment as a mixed-integer program with the aim
to maximize the sum-rate achieved by all contending SU s over
all available spectrum opportunities. Due to the NP-hardness
nature of this problem, they transform it into a binary linear
programming problem which they solve in polynomial time.
In [138], the authors formulate the joint QoS-aware admission
control, channel assignment, and power allocation as a non-
linear NP-hard optimization problem. In [139] the channel
assignment problem is expressed as an Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (ILP) problem. These approaches rely on heuristics
to solve the spectrum assignment due to the complexity of the
formulated optimization problems.
b) Power control and beamforming
Power control and beamforming are effective methods for
mitigating co-channel interference and thus boosting the sys-
tem capacity. The challenge with power control and beam-
forming in CRN s lies in making sure that SU s’ transmissions
do not cause the received interference at PU s to exceed a
tolerable limit. In light of this, a number of beamforming and
power allocation techniques have been proposed for CRN s
with various objectives, such as capacity maximization [140]
and transmit power minimization.
For instance, Le et al. [141] propose to formulate the joint
rate and power allocation problems for the secondary links
as optimization problems with both QoS and interference
constraints under low network load conditions. This work
relies on two popular fairness criteria, namely, the max-min
and the proportional fairness criteria. Kim et al. [142] develop
joint admission control and rate/power allocation methods
subject to QoS and minimum rate requirements as well as
maximum transmit power and fairness constraints for SU s in
MIMO ad hoc CRN s.
Zhang et al. [140] consider beamforming and power al-
location jointly for SIMO-MAC, and formulate it as two
optimization problems: sum-rate maximization and SINR bal-
ancing. These problems are solved using a water-filling based
algorithm and constraint decoupling techniques. The goal is to
obtain the suboptimal power allocation strategy and to maxi-
mize the minimal ratio of the achievable SINRs relative to the
target SINRs of the users in the system under a sum-power
constraint. Zheng et al. [143] propose beamforming designs
for a multi-antenna CRN , with the aim of allowing multiple
SU transmissions concurrently with the PU presence, to
achieve also SINR balancing subject to the constraints of the
total SU s transmit power and the received interference power
at the PU s. This is achieved by optimizing the beamforming
vectors at the SU transmitter based on imperfect channel state
information (CSI).
2) Spectrum access
Spectrum access of CRN s is responsible for the sharing
of the spectrum among SU s by handling medium contention,
interference avoidance, multi-user coexistence, etc. [144].
a) Access paradigms
There are three spectrum access paradigms in CRN s:
Spectrum underlay: This paradigm mandates that SU s can
transmit concurrently with PU s only if doing so generates an
amount of interference at the primary receivers that is below
some acceptable threshold [142], [145].
Spectrum overlay: Spectrum overlay paradigm also allows
concurrent primary and secondary transmissions. But SU s
are assumed to have knowledge about certain primary trans-
mission parameters to avoid interference with the primary
transmissions. The enabling premise for overlay systems is
that SU s are allowed to use the spectrum for their own
transmissions as long as they are willing to use some of their
power to relay some of PU s’ transmissions [146].
Spectrum interweave: This paradigm is based on the
opportunistic spectrum access idea, which has been one of
the main drivers for cognitive radio access. Different from
the two previous paradigms, this paradigm does not allow
simultaneous secondary and primary transmissions on the
same frequency band. Instead, it allows SU s to access and use
the licensed spectrum only when the spectrum is vacant [145].
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b) Spectrum access techniques
Many MAC protocols have been proposed to coordinate
SU s to access and share the available channels and to avoid
(or reduce) collisions among users [140]. Such a coordinated
access could be performed in a distributed or a centralized
way [144]. These protocols can either be cooperative [147],
[148] in that they require coordination among SU s to enable
efficient sharing of spectrum and thus improve spectrum
utilization, or contention-based [149], [150] in that no coordi-
nation is required among users. In contention-based protocols,
cognitive senders and receivers exchange their sensing results
through handshaking mechanisms to negotiate which channel
they will use for their communications [144]. Tan et al. [107]
propose an overlapping channel assignment algorithm and
design a MAC protocol to resolve the access contention
problem when multiple SU s attempt to exploit the same
available channel. Salameh et al [151] propose a contention-
based protocol that tries to satisfy QoS constraints by limiting
the number of used channels per SU .
In coordination-based protocols, each SU shares its channel
usage information with its neighbors to increase sensing
reliability, and to improve overall system performance [144].
For instance, Hamdaoui et al. [148] propose a coordination-
based MAC protocol that adaptively and dynamically seeks
and exploits opportunities in both licensed and unlicensed
spectra and along both the time and the frequency domains.
Zhao et al. [152] propose a heterogeneous distributed MAC
protocol that permits distributed coordination of local clusters
in a multi-hop CRN through a local common channel.
c) Sources of location information leakage
The sharing of information during this coordination process,
though needed for enabling efficient multiple access, could
expose the location information of SU s to one another.
Sensing outcomes: Contention-based MAC protocols may
require SU s to share their sensing outcomes with one another
to negotiate their access to the spectrum. However, as we
have shown in Section II-A3a, these sensing outcomes can
potentially leak SU s’ location information.
Channel usage information: Channel usage information,
when shared among SU s as in coordination-based MAC
protocols, is shown to leak details about their location; this
will be discussed later in Section II-D2.
3) Spectrum trading
Spectrum trading could be seen as the economic aspect of
spectrum sharing [153]. It aims to maximize the revenue of the
spectrum owners, i.e. PU s, while maximizing the satisfaction
of SU s [154] that compete for gaining access to the spectrum.
Spectrum trading can be done between PU s and SU s or
among SU s only [153]. It relies mainly on two concepts:
Auction theory and market theory. Next, we highlight these
two concepts and investigate their sources of leakage.
a) Auction
A typical dynamic spectrum auction has three main phases:
1) Spectrum discovery phase: SU s obtain spectrum availability
information through one of the spectrum opportunity discovery
approaches, explained in Section II-A, and determine the bid
price for each available channel based on its quality. 2) Bidding
phase: each SU submits its bids and its location along with
its ID to the auctioneer. 3) Channel assignment: once the
auctioneer collects all the bids from SU s, it distributes chan-
nels among them and charges the winners accordingly [155].
This is suitable for situations when the price of the spectrum
is undetermined and depends on SU ’s requirements [154].
Auction-based spectrum sharing for CRN s has been studied
intensively in literature (e.g., [156]–[158]).
b) Market theory
Monopoly Market: This is the simplest market structure
as there is only one seller, i.e. PU , in the system. Based on
SU s’ demand, the seller can optimize the trading process to
obtain the highest profit [153], [159], [160].
Oligopoly Market: This is a type of market that lies
between full competition and no competition (or monopoly)
and is defined as a market with only a small number of firms
and with substantial barriers to entry in economics [21]. These
firms or primary service providers compete with each other
independently to achieve the highest profit by controlling the
quantity or the price of the supplied commodity which is the
spectrum resource in this case. Unlike the monopoly case,
in oligopoly, there are multiple firms that provide the same
service, making it necessary for firms to consider each other’s
strategy [153]. The most basic form of oligopoly is duopoly,
where only two sellers exist in the market [159], [160].
Market-equilibrium: In this spectrum trading model, the
primary service provider or spectrum seller is assumed to be
not aware of other service providers, which could be due to
the lack of any centralized controller or information exchange
among each other. This makes the spectrum seller naively set
the price according to the spectrum demand of SU s. This
price reflects the willingness of the spectrum seller to sell
its spectrum which is generally determined by the supply
function. On the other hand, the willingness of a SU to buy
spectrum is determined by the demand function [116]. Market-
equilibrium aims at giving a price for which spectrum supply
from a primary service provider is equal to spectrum demand
from SU s [21]. This price achieves two goals: the spectrum
supply of the primary service provider meets all spectrum
demand of SU s, and the spectrum market does not have an
excess in the supply [116].
c) Sources of location information leakage
Spectrum trading may also introduce some sources of
location information leakage as we discuss next.
Location information: During the bidding phase of spec-
trum auction, SU s may need to submit their locations to the
auctioneer as suggested in [155]. This is clearly an obvious
source of location information leakage as it exposes the loca-
tion information of SU s to the auctioneer and to an external
adversary that may be eavesdropping the communications of
SU s during the auction process.
Bid channels: SU s here need to submit their bids for their
channels of interest to the auctioneer (or spectrum broker) . An
adversary aiming to infer a SU ’s location can deduce, from
the list of channels SU bids for, that SU is located somewhere
where these channels are available. Simple intersection of the
availability areas of these channels can easily locate SU [155].
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Bid prices: For each channel available for auction, a
SU can first evaluate its quality and, depending on the
channel’s quality, establish a price for it. It then submits its
bid for the channel to the broker. These prices are shown to be
a potential source of SU s’ location information leakage [155].
D. Location information leakage in spectrum mobility
SU s communicating on a licensed spectrum band may need
to vacate their current band at any time, for instance, due to
the return of PU s to their licensed band. When this happens,
SU s need to find and switch their ongoing communications to
another vacant band to avoid the disruption of their ongoing
transmissions. This is known as spectrum mobility or spectrum
handoff [161]. There are several events that could trigger
spectrum handoff in CRN s, and next, we list some of them:
• PU ’s return: Whenever a PU returns to its channel,
SU is forced to vacate it and switch to another available
one, if any. This initiates the handoff process. Finding a
new available channel often requires SU to perform spec-
trum sensing, making handoff more challenging [162].
• SU ’s mobility: Because spectrum availability is location
dependent, moving while having an ongoing communi-
cation may trigger spectrum handoff, as current channel
may no longer be available in SU ’s new location [163].
• Quality degradation: Spectrum handoff could be trig-
gered by the degradation of the channel quality. It can
be triggered when, for example, the QoS level received
by SU goes below a certain threshold, forcing it to find
and switch to another channel.
1) Spectrum handoff strategies
Based on the handoff triggering timing, spectrum handoff
techniques could be classified into four categories or strate-
gies: Non-handoff strategy, reactive handoff strategy, proactive
handoff strategy, and hybrid handoff strategy [164], [165]. We
first explore these different strategies, then we investigate their
sources of location information leakage.
a) Non-handoff strategy
In this strategy, when one of the triggering events for
handoff occurs, SU s stop transmitting over the current channel
and choose not to switch to another channel. Instead they
remain idle until the channel becomes available again [166],
as introduced in the non-hopping mode of the IEEE 802.22
WRAN standard [167]. How good this handoff strategy is
depends on the activities and loads of PU s. It causes very
little to no PU interference but the waiting latency to resume
secondary transmission could be unpredictably very large, as
it depends on when PU leaves the spectrum. This strategy is
best suited for systems with short PU transmissions [164].
b) Pure reactive handoff strategy
In this strategy, the target channel selection and the handoff
are performed reactively after a spectrum handoff trigger-
ing event occurs [165], [168]. Here, SU s need to perform
spectrum sensing in order to find the target backup chan-
nel to which communication is to be transferred. Several
reactive handoff strategy-based approaches are proposed in
the literature [169], [170]. In general, this strategy has less
handoff latency than that of the non-handoff strategy, but
has larger latency when compared to the proactive spectrum
handoff strategy [164], [165] (described next). The handoff
performance of this strategy depends on the accuracy and
speed of the spectrum sensing process in identifying a vacant
target channel.
c) Pure proactive handoff strategy
In this approach, the handoff and the target channel selection
are performed proactively before a spectrum handoff triggering
event takes place [171], [172]. SU s do so by periodically
observing all channels to obtain spectrum usage statistics
which allow them to determine the candidate channels for
spectrum handoff [168]. The selection of the target free
channel for future spectrum handoff is usually made based
on PU traffic characteristics [165], where SU s can predict
PU arrivals in the target spectrum band in advance. Hence,
the handoff latency is reduced considerably when compared to
the reactive spectrum handoff strategy, which requires taking
action after the handoff triggering event takes place. However,
if the prediction of PU traffic is inaccurate or if the target
backup channel is obsolete, for instance due to being occupied
by other SU s at handoff time, this could lead to poor handoff
performance [164]. This makes this strategy best suited to
networks with well-modeled PU traffic characteristics.
d) Hybrid handoff strategy
This approach combines proactive spectrum sensing with re-
active spectrum handoff as suggested by Christian et al. [164].
It performs proactive spectrum sensing to decide on the
backup target channel in advance and before the handoff is
triggered, and makes a reactive handoff decision after the
triggering event takes place. Thus, it reduces the handoff
latency when compared to the reactive handoff strategy. This
hybrid approach could be seen as a tradeoff between reactive
and proactive handoff strategies.
2) Sources of location information leakage
Spectrum mobility can also leak some location information
about SU s, as highlighted next:
Handoff: Recall that a SU utilizing a PU channel is forced
to vacate the channel (and possibly switch to another) when
PU returns to and claims its channel. PU (and easily other
entities) knows, in this situation, that SU is located within its
coverage area. Handoff can thus lead to leakage of location
information of SU performing handoff.
Spectrum utilization information: A SU ’s spectrum usage
history (e.g., sequence of channels SU has used over some
period of time) could easily be used to localize SU (or to track
it if it is moving). Recall that when a SU is communicating
over a PU channel, it means that SU is outside the coverage
areas of all ON PU s associated with that channel, or inside
the area of an OFF PU . Now, for instance, by tracking
which channels SU has used over a period of time and by
knowing when and which PU s are OFF/ON during that time
period, an adversary can easily narrow down the area where
SU is located at by intersecting the areas associated with
PU s [54]. Spectrum utilization history information could then
be a significant source of location information leakage.
Sensing reports: Before handoff, a SU may need to sense
the spectrum to identify a new target channel (using one
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of PU detection techniques identified in Section II-A1a).
If cooperation is further required to select the appropriate
channel for handoff, SU s will have to share their sensing
reports, which can compromise their location privacy.
Location privacy-preserving protocols should therefore be
designed with the objective of hiding information that can leak
SU ’s location during the handoff process and also reducing,
as much as possible, the occurrences of handoff events.
E. Summary
In this section, we identified the sources of location privacy
leakage emerging from the different components of CRN s,
namely, spectrum discovery, spectrum analysis, spectrum shar-
ing, and spectrum mobility. We highlighted the different
functionalities of each of these components, and discussed how
some of these functionalities can present some vulnerabilities
that could be exploited to localize SU s. In the next section,
we will go over a family of renowned privacy enhancing tech-
nologies and generic crypto schemes that we believe are the
most relevant to CRN s. We will also discuss to which extent
these technologies could be applied to design location privacy-
preserving protocols that could prevent attacks exploiting the
identified vulnerabilities.
III. LIMITATIONS OF GENERIC PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES IN CRNS
Location privacy preservation is a mature technology for
many wireless systems, such as sensor [7], vehicular [173],
[174], WiFi [9], cellular [10], and others [175]. Depending
on the wireless system and application at hand, location
information can be leaked through various means, ranging
from wireless signal localization [7], [9] to traffic monitoring
and analysis [8]. For instance, in sensor networks, location
information can be inferred by monitoring packet reception
times [8] or analyzing packet traffic [176], [177] of source
nodes. Countermeasure solutions for these attacks have also
been proposed, ranging from introducing randomness to multi-
hop path selection [178], [179] to making the source nodes
move randomly [8] to confuse the attackers. Unlike other
wireless systems, location privacy preservation that addresses
vulnerabilities in CRN s has not, however, received much at-
tention, though several works related to spectrum sensing [11],
[54], [55], [72], [180]–[182], spectrum auction bids [155],
[183], subscriber identification [184], and database-driven
DSA [54], [55], [180]–[182], [185] have been proposed.
A. Adaptation of existing privacy enhancing technologies
Direct adaptation of existing Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (PETs), such as Searchable Encryption (SE) (e.g., [186]–
[190]) and Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
(e.g., [191] [192], [193]), which enable a client to outsource
its data to a database in an encrypted form so it can perform
search queries on it, cannot, for example, be used as they are
in database-driven DSA to enable private spectrum informa-
tion retrieval. There have also been proposed cryptographic
techniques that enable generic (e.g., Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) [194]–[196]) or specific (e.g., functional
encryption [197], [198]) data processing over encrypted data,
and these existing PETs cannot be directly adapted either to fit
the CRN context, so that SU s’ location privacy is preserved
while still querying the spectrum database for availability
information in an effective manner. Architectural differences
and performance requirements of CRN s make direct adap-
tation extremely ineffective. Privacy-preserving search/access
techniques, such as SE or ORAM, are specifically designed for
a data outsourcing model [189], [190], [199], in which a client
encrypts its own data with its private key and then outsources
it to the database. However, in database-driven DSA, a third
party owns and manages the spectrum database. Therefore, it
is impractical for database owners to generate a searchable
encrypted copy of the database for each single user (note that
the initialization phase of these PETs are highly costly [187],
[193]). Existing, fully generic techniques such as FHE [194],
[195]) are, on the other hand, extremely costly and therefore
impractical for CRN s.
That is said, there have been several attempts that aimed
to adapt existing PETs to fit the CRN context. In the case
of database-driven DSA for example, the proposed techniques
that aim to protect the location information of SU s when they
are querying databases for spectrum availability information
rely on either k-anonymity [200], [201] or PIR (private
information retrieval) [202], [203]. k-anonymity approaches
(e.g., [55]) essentially rely on a third party, known as the
anonymizer, to ensure that the probability of identifying the
location of a querying user remains under 1/k, where k is
the size of the anonymity set to be received by the untrusted
database (alternatively, the anonymity set can be constructed
distributedly instead of relying on a third party). k-anonymity
approaches are known to suffer from one major problem:
they cannot achieve high location privacy without incurring
substantial communication/computation overhead (e.g., higher
privacy means higher k). They often compromise the location
privacy at the benefit of lowering the incurred overhead, or
vice-versa [204]. PIR-based approaches [54], [180], [181], on
the other hand, offer much better privacy than k-anonymity
approaches, but also incur substantial overhead, thus limiting
their practical use for CRN s [205]. Proposed approaches
relying on these technologies will be discussed in more details
in later sections.
In what follows from this section, we take a closer look
at some of the most known and generic PETs and discuss
why they cannot be used off-the-shelf as they are in the
context of CRN s to protect SU s from location inference
attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities identified in Section II.
These techniques, include homomorphic encryption, oblivious
transfer, private information retrieval, data outsourcing-based
techniques, differential privacy, and secure multiparty compu-
tation.
B. Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a special form of encryption
that allows computations to be performed on ciphertexts. It
generates an encrypted result whose decryption matches the
result of operations performed on the plaintexts. There are
two kinds of homomorphic encryption: full and partial.
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1) Fully homomorphic encryption
This is a special type of homomorphic encryption which
allows the computation of arbitrary functions on encrypted
data without decrypting it. This concept was first introduced
by Gentry [206] and is based on the properties of ideal lattices.
Theoretically speaking, this is a very powerful concept as it
permits the construction of a program that performs all kind
of operations on the ciphertexts. Since such a program does
not need to decrypt its inputs, it can be run by an untrusted
party without revealing its inputs and internal state, making it
an attractive tool for preserving privacy.
This might seem applicable in the context of CRN to hide,
for example, the observations of SU s (proven to leak infor-
mation about SU s location as discussed in Section II-A3a)
during the spectrum sensing phase and share them with FC (or
other SU s) without worrying about SU ’s location privacy. The
main issue, however, with this type of encryption is that it
involves high computation and requires large storage, making
it unpractical. Another major issue with this encryption is
that the search time resulting from using fully homomorphic
encryption is linear in the length of the dataset. This again
makes it unpractical, especially for applications with large
datasets like spectrum geolocation databases.
2) Partially homomorphic encryption
A partially homomorphic cryptosystem is an encryption
scheme that, unlike fully homomorphic encryption, can only
perform either multiplication or addition on the ciphertexts, but
not both. Several cryptosystems with homomorphic propoer-
ties were proposed in the literature. Paillier cryptosystem [207]
is one of the most famous additive homomorphic schemes. Ex-
amples of multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystems include
El Gamal [208] and RSA [209]. Thanks to their homomorphic
properties, these schemes could be used in situations that re-
quire performing some basic operations on sensitive data while
hiding user inputs (like when reporting sensing information).
Partially homomorphic encryption is more practical than the
fully homomorphic one; however, for them to provide high
security level, they incur large communication and computa-
tional overhead. This makes it unpractical to use especially for
large CRN s if not used judiciously.
C. Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer (OT ) is a privacy enhancing protocol that
enables a sender to transfer one of many pieces of data to a
receiver, while keeping the sender oblivious as to which piece
has been sent and while making sure that the receiver receives
only one message. The simplest flavour of this protocol, 1-
out-of -2, was first introduced by Rabin [210] and was later
generalized to 1-out-of -n and k-out-of -n cases. In the 1-
out-of -n case, as explained in Figure 6, the sender has n
messages and the receiver has an index i. The receiver wants
to learn the ith message without the sender learning i. On the
other hand, the sender wants that the receiver only learns one
message among the n messages. This could be thought of as
a suitable approach to use for extracting spectrum availability
information from the spectrum DB . This approach, however,
incurs very large communication and computational overheads
which makes it unpractical in a delay sensitive problem like
spectrum availability discovery.
Figure 6: Oblivious transfer for the case 1-out-of -n
D. Private information retrieval (PIR)
This concept was first introduced by Chor et al. [202]. It
allows users to privately retrieve records from a database while
preventing the latter from learning which records are being
retrieved. This could be thought of as a weaker version of
1-out-of -n OT which further requires that the receiver does
not learn anything about the other entries in the database.
PIR approaches could be classified into two cate-
gories: Information-theoretic PIR and computational PIR. In
information-theoretic setting, the reconstruction of the client’s
query is impossible no matter how much computation the
adversary would perform. A trivial PIR approach could
be to download the entire database. This would offer an
information-theoretic privacy, i.e. unbreakable privacy, but on
the other hand involves enormous communication overhead.
Any information-theoretical PIR solution has a communica-
tion overhead of at least the size of the database as proven
by Chor [202]. Fortunately, this applies only to the case
where the database is stored only on a single server. One
way to get around this extensive overhead is by assuming
that the database is replicated in several servers that do not
communicate with each other. This way, a non-trivial theoretic
PIR solution that has communication overhead smaller than
the database size turns out to be feasible. An information-
theoretic approach in this model means that an individual
database server cannot learn which element was retrieved by
the user, no matter how much computation it may perform
as long as it does not collude with the other servers [211].
Several approaches proposed in the literature considerably
reduce the communication overhead of information theoretic
PIR (e.g. [212] where the communication cost is O(n1/2k−1)
with k is the number of database servers).
On the other hand, in computational PIR approaches, the
security is based on hard-to-solve well-known cryptographic
problems, e.g. discrete logarithm or factorization [213]. This
makes them secure against computationally bounded adver-
saries. But an adversary with sufficient computational re-
sources can learn the client’s query by breaking the underlying
security system. Some computational PIR approaches are able
to provide poly-logarithmic communication complexity [211].
Gentry et al. [214] propose the most communication efficient
PIR that has a constant communication overhead.
Even though research on PIR is making progress in terms
of reducing the overhead, PIR approaches still suffer from
large overhead that limits their practicality and impedes their
off-the-shelf use without adaptation in the context of CRN s.
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E. Data outsourcing-based techniques
These techniques are designed for applications that require
secure data outsourcing, where a client’s sensitive data is
outsourced to a third-party storage provider, e.g. the cloud.
Existing access control solutions focus mainly on preserving
confidentiality of stored data from unauthorized access and
the storage provider. Next, we discuss two well known data
outsourcing based PETs: searchable symmetric encryption
(SSE ) and oblivious random access memory (ORAM ).
1) Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE )
Searchable symmetric encryption is a PET that is largely
deployed to privately outsource one’s data to another party
while maintaining the ability to selectively search over it [199].
This means that a client needs to outsource its data to a
database/server in an encrypted form to be able to later per-
form private search queries on it as shown in Figure 7. Despite
Figure 7: Searchable symmetric encryption
its efficiency and the high level of privacy that SSE provides,
it cannot be applied to database-based CRN s simply because
in SSE , the data has to be outsourced by the client, whereas in
database based CRN s, the data about spectrum availability is
generated and provided by the service operator that manages
the spectrum database. This means that SU s have no control
over this data and, thus, they cannot encrypt it and outsource
it to DB as required by SSE .
2) Oblivious random access memory (ORAM )
Encrypting its outsourced data is not sufficient for a user to
protect the confidentiality of his/her data content as his/her
access pattern to the data remains unprotected which may
reveal the user’s private information. ORAM is introduced by
Goldreich et al. [191] to not only preserve data confidentiality
but also to hide a user’s access pattern to its outsourced data
blocks. Traditionally, ORAM has been designed to arrange the
data such that the user never touches the same piece twice,
without an intermediate shuffle. This erases the correlation
between block locations and obfuscates the memory accesses
of data, so that access patterns do not leak information about
the stored data. Just like SSE , ORAM can only fit to the
problem of data outsourcing which is not suitable to the
context of CRN s for the same reasons discussed for SSE .
F. Differential privacy
This is a recent privacy concept tailored to the statistical
disclosure control problem which is defined as follows: how
to release statistical information about a set of people without
compromising the privacy of any individual [215]. Its goal is to
assure a good statistical accuracy while preserving individual’s
privacy. It is a well established definition guaranteeing that
queries to a database do not reveal too much information about
specific individuals who have contributed to the database as
suggested in [216]. The formal definition of this concept could
be found in [217]. The basic idea behind it is that for two
almost identical input data sets, the outputs of the mechanism
that provides differential privacy are almost identical. More
precisely, it requires that the probability that a query returns
a value v when applied to a database D, compared to the
probability to report the same value when applied to an
adjacent database D′ ( i.e. D, D′ differ in at most 1 entry)
should be within a bound of exp for some privacy level
. Since differential privacy is a probabilistic concept, any
differentially private mechanism is necessarily random. A
typical way to achieve this notion is to add controlled random
noise, drawn from a Laplace distribution for instance, to the
query output. One benefit of this concept is that a mechanism
can be shown to be differentially private independently from
any side information that the adversary might have.
However, standard differential privacy techniques usually
perform poorly in situations where participants contribute
various time-series data that could be aggregated and mined for
useful information, due to noise [218]. Examples of time-series
data may include users’ current locations, weather information
or information obtained from other participatory sensing appli-
cations like spectrum sensing in CRN s [218]. Moreover, the
nature of differential privacy concept makes it poorly suitable
for applications that involve a single user, such as spectrum
database-based opportunities discovery, where the location of a
single user has to be hidden. Thus, it requires that any change
in a user’s location have negligible effect on the published
output of the query, which makes it impossible to communicate
any useful information to the service provider [219]. Despite
this, some approaches try to adapt this concept to the context
of CRN s as we show in Sections IV & V.
G. Secure multiparty computation (MPC)
The concept of secure multiparty computation (MPC ) orig-
inates from the works of Yao [220] and Goldreich et al. [221].
It allows a group of n mutually distrusting parties P1, ..., Pn,
holding private inputs x1, ..., xn to securely compute a joint
function f(x1, ..., xn) = (y1, ..., yn) on these inputs [222].
The goal is to make each party Pi learn only yi but nothing
else. This could be achieved through an interactive protocol,
executed between these parties, whose execution should be
equivalent to having a trusted party that privately receives xis
from Pis, computes f and returns yis to Pis. This protocol
should be able to give the correct result to honest parties even
if some parties are dishonest.
In a CRN context, this could be an attractive tool to
provide privacy for any task that involves some computation
between several entities. For instance, this could be used in
distributed cooperative spectrum sensing during the spectrum
discovery phase to allow SU s to collaborate in order to
compute statistics over the sensing reports while preserving
the privacy of their reports and thus their location. Another
potential use of MPC could be during the coalition formation
process, again in the spectrum discovery phase, to prevent
leaking SNR values that can compromise SU s’ location as
explained in Section II-A3a. MPC could also be used in game
theoretical approaches during the spectrum sharing phase to
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prevent the leakage that can arise from the local decisions
shared between different SU s during the game. Furthermore,
this could be an attractive tool also to protect the bids of
SU s during the auction process that is performed to ensure
spectrum sharing among SU s. As explained in Section II-C3c,
the auction process may leak some information about SU s’
location which makes it natural to consider leveraging sealed
bids or relying on a trusted party for the auction. Ideally, an
MPC protocol should be equivalent to a trusted third party;
hence, MPC could play this role and replace an untrusted
auctioneer as suggested in [222].
It is obvious that the potential applications of MPC are
multifold due to its flexibility to emulate multiple scenarios.
However, the bottleneck is its extensive computational and
communication overhead, which makes its deployment diffi-
cult in practical situations, and more precisely in the context
of CRN s, at least for the time being.
H. Summary
In this section, we explored a family of renowned PETs
and generic crypto schemes that we believe are the most
relevant to CRN s. We highlighted the benefits and limitations
of applying these schemes to CRN off-the-shelf as they are. In
the following section, we will present and discuss location pri-
vacy preservation approaches proposed for protecting location
privacy during the spectrum opportunity discovery process.
We will explore the different threat models, location inference
attacks, and location privacy preserving techniques that are
specific to this spectrum discovery component.
IV. LOCATION PRIVACY PRESERVATION FOR SPECTRUM
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY COMPONENT
In this section, we investigate the different approaches
proposed in the literature to deal with the location privacy
issue in CRN s during the spectrum opportunity discovery
phase. First, we discuss the challenges that face designing
SU ’s location privacy preserving protocols in both cooperative
spectrum sensing and geolocation database-based approaches.
Then, we list the different threat models that need to be
considered in these two approaches. After that, we detail
existing and potential attacks that could be performed by
malicious entities to localize SU s by exploiting the vulner-
abilities that we identified in Section II-A. Subsequently, we
describe existing solutions that are proposed to cope with these
attacks and preserve SU s’ location privacy. Finally, we explain
the performance metrics that are or could be used to assess
the performance and reliability of location privacy preserving
protocols in CRN s, and present tradeoffs that are considered
when designing these protocols.
A. Location privacy in cooperative spectrum sensing
As discussed in Section II-A3a, the cooperation among SU s
during the sensing process gives rise to several vulnerabilities
that could be exploited to compromise SU s’ location privacy.
Thus, location privacy preservation protocols for cooperative
sensing need to be designed with several goals in mind:
• Hide sensing information. As explained in Sec-
tion II-A3a, SU s’ sensing reports may leak information
about their locations [223]. Hence, one main goal of
these protocols is to hide sensing reports by concealing
the observed sensing information from decision makers
or any potential external attackers that might eavesdrop
SU ’s communications [11], [224]–[227].
• Achieve accurate spectrum availability information. Pro-
tocols need to preserve the location privacy of SU s,
but without compromising their ability to still provide
accurate spectrum availability information. Achieving this
design goal is very challenging, due to its conflicting
nature: hiding information for the privacy protection pur-
pose may limit the ability to provide accurate spectrum
availability information.
• Optimize resource usage. An important limitation that
needs to be accounted for when designing privacy pre-
serving protocols is SU s’ resource capability. It is then
important to design protocols that require minimum com-
putation and storage resources and incur limited com-
munication overheads. This, for instance, implies that
expensive cryptographic approaches are to be avoided.
• Hide SNR values. Another goal that needs be aimed
at is to hide the SNR values that SU s might need to
exchange to form coalitions, for example. As explained
in Section II-A3a, SNR may leak significant information
about SU s’ location, and thus a reliable location privacy
preserving scheme needs to conceal these values without
hindering the CRN operations relying on them.
1) Threat models
Several threat models are considered in the literature to
study and address SU s’ location privacy issue in cooperative
spectrum sensing:
• Dolev–Yao threat model. In this model the adversary,
usually an intruder, can overhear, intercept, and synthe-
size any message that is exchanged between SU s and
FC or even between SU s themselves during the coop-
erative spectrum sensing process. The adversary is only
limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods
used [228]. This model is considered in [53], [226], [227]
• Semi-honest or honest-but-curious threat model. This
means that the adversary, that could be a FC [11], [224],
[226], [227], a SU [226], [227] or an additional entity as
in [227], follows the sensing protocol honestly without
changing any of its parameters. However, it shows some
interest in learning the location information of target SU s
by exploiting their sensing reports.
• Malicious threat model. Entities in the CRN may be
malicious, meaning that FC , SU or any other entity
involved in the cooperative spectrum sensing process
can change their parameters and lead several attacks to
localize a target SU .
• Non-collusion threat model. FC , SU s and any other
entities in the CRN do not collude to infer target SU s’
location [226], [227]. This means that these entities do
not share what they learned about target SU s’ location
during the cooperative spectrum sensing process.
• Collusion threat model. FC or some SU s may collude
with other SU s or entities and work together to infer tar-
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get SU s’ location [11], [225] by exploiting their sensing
reports and communication signals.
2) Location inference attacks
Location inference attacks exploit the vulnerabilities and
the sources of leakage that we explained in Section II-A3a to
localize SU s. These attacks could be performed by an internal
entity (e.g. another SU or FC ) or an external attacker that does
not belong to the CRN . These attacks can be classified into
two categories, based on the information used for localization:
Geometric localization and fingerprinting.
a) Geometric localization based attacks
These attacks exploit channel parameter measurements in-
cluding RSS , SNR, AoA, ToA and TDoA to localize a
target SU . RSS , SNR and ToA could be used to get the
range information, as explained in Section II-A3a, which
is essential for the trilateration localization technique [56],
[72]. Trilateration is a very simple and intuitive approach
that computes the position of a target node by finding the
intersection of three circles that model the range with respect
to at least three anchor nodes as depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Localization of an SU via Trilateration using the ranges
d1, d2 and d3 corresponding to PU 1, PU 2 and PU 3 respectively.
In the context of CRN , the anchor nodes could be three
PU s whose locations, depending on the situation, could be
publicly known. Thus, an attacker that has access to the
RSS s that a SU measures with respect to three channels
could exploit this knowledge to localize SU using trilatera-
tion. SNR could also be used in a similar way, as reported
in [72], for ad hoc CRN s. The attack can occur during the
process of forming coalitions and choosing coalition heads as
these operations require exchanging SNR information between
SU s. Another attack scenario could involve multiple attackers
or colluding nodes that belong to the CRN and that have a
direct communication with the target node.
Triangulation is also another technique that exploits channel
parameter measurements for localization purposes. It uses
angles instead of distances and requires at least two reference
nodes to localize the target node [229]. The two reference
nodes measure the AoA of the signal coming from the target
node. The position of the target node is the intersection of
the two lines along the angles from each reference node as
in Figure 9. As this attack requires a direct communication
between the victim and the attackers, this implies that the
attackers, which are also the reference nodes in this case,
belong to the CRN , e.g. two colluding malicious SU s.
Figure 9: Localization of an SU via Triangulation using the angles
of arrivals, AoAs, θ1 and θ2 of the SU ’s signal measured respectively
at PU 1 and PU 2
Geometric localization attacks may be performed in CRN s
that deploy crowdsourcing (explained in Section II-A1b) for
spectrum sensing. For instance, Jin et al. [46] propose an attack
scenario that targets the location privacy of participants in the
crowdsourcing process. They consider a special setting where
these participants compete to perform spectrum sensing tasks
at specific locations via a reverse combinatorial auction oper-
ation [230]. During this auction, participants send their bids,
corresponding to their claimed cost of performing the sensing
tasks. This cost, as modeled by the authors, involves the round
trip distance that a participant needs to travel to perform the
sensing tasks and return back to its current location, called
base location, which is the target of the proposed attack. This
attack exploits the geometric relationship between users bids
and the distance they travel to perform the sensing.
b) Fingerprinting based attacks
These attacks are more suitable in situations where the
geometric relationships between SU s’ positions and measure-
ments cannot be established. It estimates the victim’s location
by finding the best matched fingerprint for the corresponding
measurement within a pre-built RF map. It consists mainly
of two phases: An off-line or training phase and an on-line
or test phase. In the off-line phase, the RF map is generated.
This map could be the REM (discussed in Section II-B1c) if
the attacker is FC or a SU that has access to it, or it could be
a map that an external attacker has built by itself. Figure 10
shows a simplified example of how this kind of localization
works.
Figure 10: Localization of an SU via Fingerprinting using its
RSS signature [RSS1,RSS2,RSS3] with respect to 3 channels and
the REM database.
Li et al. [11] consider two attacks that rely on this principle
to localize a SU based on its RSS measurements that it
shares with FC in a centralized CRN . They assume that an
attacker constructs a signal propagation model by collecting
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all the sensing reports transmitted within the network [11].
The attacker uses machine learning techniques, for example
k-means classifier as in [11], to partition the RSS data into
multiple sets corresponding to various locations. The first
attack, called single report location privacy (SRLP) Attack,
involves an external attacker that eavesdrops SU s’ communi-
cations or an internal attacker that could be an untrusted FC or
a compromised SU . Under this attack, the attacker exploits
individual RSS measurements of SU s to localize them by
computing the distance between each sensing report and the
centroids of each cluster in the signal propagation model
that is built beforehand by the attacker. The second attack
that they propose is called differential location privacy (DLP)
attack which estimates the sensing report of a SU during
the aggregation process performed by FC . In this attack, the
attacker compares the changes of the aggregation results after
a SU joins or leaves the CRN and then it infers its location
by finding to which cluster the estimated report belongs to,
just like in the SRLP attack.
It is worth mentioning, however, that even though finger-
printing could be attractive for leading location inference
attacks, it is not necessarily practical unless the attacker is
very powerful with lots of resources. This is due to the fact
that the construction of accurate radio maps and fingerprints
requires considerable off-line effort and may give rise to
several challenges. These include, but are not limited to, the
huge number of measurements that need to be taken and also
the need to regularly update the radio map due to the inherent
time varying nature of wireless channels and networks [56].
3) Location privacy preserving approaches
As explained in Section II-A1b, SU s in cooperative spec-
trum sensing CRN s need, first, to share their observations
either with FC (in centralized CRN s) or with other SU s (in
distributed CRN s). These local observations are then com-
bined to make a cooperative spectrum availability decision.
These observations could be statistics computed over the signal
or just local binary decisions made by each SU individually.
Both cases present some privacy risks to SU s as discussed in
Section II. Thus, research efforts should focus on hiding SU s’
observations from the other entities in the network. Most of
the existent works that we discuss in this Section consider the
location inference attack from the sensing reports that SU s
share. We summarize these works in Table III and we discuss
them in more details in the following.
Li et al. [11] introduce an approach that uses secret shar-
ing and the privacy preserving aggregation process proposed
in [231] to conceal the content of the sensing reports. This
scheme uses also dummy report injections to replace the report
of a leaving SU in order to cope with the differential location
privacy attack (explained in Section IV-A2b) and prevent a
malicious FC from estimating the sensing report of the leaving
SU . Moreover, this scheme can bear collusion attacks involv-
ing FC and some compromised SU s. Despite its merits, it
has several limitations: (i) FC needs to collect all the sensing
reports in order to be able to decode the aggregated result.
Obviously, this could not be fault tolerant, since some reports
may be missing due, for example, to the unreliable nature of
wireless channels. (ii) It cannot handle network dynamism
if multiple SU s join or leave the network simultaneously,
as it can only deal with the event of one SU leaving or
joining the network at a time. (iii) The pairwise secret sharing
requirement, that this scheme has, incurs extra communication
overhead and delay. (iv) The underlying encryption scheme
requires solving the discrete logarithm problem [213] for the
decryption, which is extremely costly and is only possible for
very small plaintext space.
Grissa et al. [42], [226] propose a location privacy pre-
serving protocol that aims to hide SU ’s sensing reports
(specifically RSS ) from FC and the sensing threshold used
for the decision from SU s. This prevents FC from trying
to localize SU s using their sensing reports and, at the same
time, prevents malicious SU s from using the sensing threshold
to manipulate their measurements and impact FC ’s decision.
This scheme relies on order preserving encryption [232] to
make SU s encrypt their sensing reports and allow FC to
learn only the relative order of these reports. Using this order
and following a binary search-like technique, FC executes
at most log n private comparisons between SU s’ RSS s and
FC ’s sensing threshold using yao’s millionaire protocol [233].
The order learned by FC aims to make the number of
private comparisons logarithmic in the number of SU s. This is
shown to provide high location privacy to SU s while enabling
an efficient sensing performance. However, even though this
approach has a low communication overhead and a logarithmic
computational overhead as a function of the number of SU s,
the computation incurred is still relatively high. This is due to
the use of the expensive yao’s millionaire protocol [233] that,
itself, relies on expensive homomorphic encryption.
Some approaches consider an intermediate node or entity to
help addressing the location privacy issue, e.g. [224], [227].
Mao et al. [224] provide an approach that requires SU s to
encrypt their RSS values using a derivative of El Gamal [208]
encryption scheme. In their approach, one of SU s is picked
to play the role of a helper to FC . First, the Helper and
FC collaborate to construct a public/secret key pair and each
of them keeps a part of the secret key for itself. Then, FC and
Helper share the public key with SU s. Subsequently, SU s
send their RSS s encrypted using this public key to the Helper
that permutes them, decrypts them with the secret part that
it has, and then sends them to FC which decrypts them
using its part of the key. Once decrypted, FC aggregates the
RSS values to make a final decision. The authors consider a
semi-honest threat model for FC and Helper and a restricted
malicious model where only SU s are malicious. However,
even though this approach guarantees that individual sensing
reports cannot be revealed neither to FC nor to the Helper, it
incurs high communication overhead. In order to provide high
enough security level, the keys of El Gamal cryptosystem, and
hence the size of the ciphertexts, need to be very large. This
makes the communication cost very high, especially when the
number of SU s is large. Moreover, as FC can learn aggregated
sensing reports of SU s, this scheme is still prone to the DLP
attack explained in Section IV-A2b.
Grissa et al. [42], [227] propose another approach that
relies also on order preserving encryption (OPE ) and on
deploying an additional node, referred to as gateway (GW ).
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TABLE III: Location privacy preserving schemes in cooperative spectrum sensing
Countermeasures Attacks Considered Techniques Pros Cons
Li et al. [11] - Location inference from sens-
ing reports (e.g. RSS )
- Privacy preserving aggrega-
tion with encryption
- Dummy report injection
- Relatively efficient against differential
privacy attacks
- Very high computational and communi-
cation overhead
- No fault tolerance
- Has a little negative effect on the sensing
performance
Grissa et al. [226] - Location inference from sens-
ing reports (e.g. RSS )
- Private comparisons using
Yao’s millionaires protocol
- Order preserving encryption
- Low communication overhead
- High location privacy
- Relatively high computational overhead
Mao et al. [224] - Location inference from sens-
ing reports (e.g. RSS )
- El Gamal cryptosystem - Considers both semi-honest and mali-
cious adversaries
- High communication overhead
- Prone to DLP attack
Wang et al. [225]
- Location inference from sens-
ing reports (e.g. RSS )
- Collusion between service
providers
- Collusion between service
providers and SU s
- Cloaking of sensing reports
- Dimension reduction of sens-
ing data through non-invertible
projection
- Considers multiple malicious service
providers
- Considers collusion between some enti-
ties
- Provides differential privacy
- Privacy level decreases with the decrease
of service providers
- Privacy level decreases with the increase
of SU s
- Some information distortion during the
cloaking process
Kasiri et al. [72] - Location inference from
SNR during coalition
formation
- Anonymization of SNRs - Takes into account SU s’ mobility
- Privacy level decreases as the number of
sensed channels increases
- Providing high location privacy degrades
sensing performance
Grissa et al. [227] - Location inference from sens-
ing reports (e.g. RSS )
- Additional entity in the net-
work
- Order preserving encryption
- Very low communication & computa-
tional overhead
- High location privacy
- Additional entity that needs to be man-
aged by a third party for non-collusion
Jin et al. [46]
- Location inference from sens-
ing cost during reverse auction
- Location inference from auc-
tion result
- Location inference
from changes in auction
participation
- Exponential mechanism for
differential privacy - Offers differential location privacy - The lower the social cost the higher thelocation information leakage
GW is deployed to perform private comparisons between
SU s’ sensing reports and the decision criteria or threshold
of FC . This is done by making each SU encrypt its RSS ,
using OPE and a unique secret key shared with FC , and
send it to GW . FC also sends n encryptions of its sensing
threshold, using OPE and the n keys established with SU s,
and sends them to GW . On top of the OPE encryption, each
entity communicating with GW encrypts its data with a key
uniquely established with GW to secure the communication.
GW removes the second layer encryption and compares each
OPE encrypted RSS to its corresponding OPE encrypted
sensing threshold (the one that FC has constructed with the
same secret key). The main advantage of this approach is its
high efficiency in terms of communication and computational
complexity due to its reliance on symmetric encryption only.
The high efficiency benefits of this technique comes, however,
at the cost of needing an additional architectural entity, GW ,
that has to be managed by a third party to avoid collusion with
SU s or FC and to provide the claimed privacy guarantees.
Other approaches consider a different CRN scenario that
consists of multiple service providers (SPs) that may exchange
sensing data among themselves as in [225]. Wang et al. [225]
propose a framework that aims to preserve SU s’ privacy
in collaborative spectrum sensing from malicious SPs. It
assumes that the only trustworthy SP for a SU is the one
serving it. The remaining SPs and SU s may collude to
infer private information about a target SU , including its
location. To preserve SU s’ privacy, this framework hides
individual sensing data of SU s by making each SP transform
sensing reports of corresponding SU s into cloaks. To find
the optimal cloaking strategy, each SP projects its original
sensing data to a single-dimensional space, with minimal
data distortion [225], using a privacy-preserving non-invertible
projection and shares statistical information of the projected
data with one SP picked as a leader. The leader uses this
information to decide about the optimal cloaking strategies
and shares it with the other SPs. The authors rely on dynamic
programming to obtain the optimal cloaking strategy that
minimizes information distortion and that is obtained through
collaboration between SPs. This scheme considers collusion
between different malicious entities and provides differential
privacy to SU s. However, its privacy level decreases with the
decrease of the number of SPs and the increase of the number
of SU s. It also introduces some distortion to the sensing
information which may impact the sensing accuracy.
Some works try also to address the location privacy issue
in distributed cooperative sensing. For example, Kasiri et
al. [72] address this issue in multi-channel cognitive radio
MANETs. They propose a scheme that relies on the notion of
anonymization to prevent location information leakage from
SNR values that are exchanged between SU s for coalition
formation purposes. Anonymization is achieved by means of
random manipulation and distortion of the exchanged SNRs,
which can leak information about the location of SU s as
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shown in Section II-A3a. Each SU creates an anonymization
area with respect to each sensed channel. However, a major
limitation of this scheme is that the more channels sensed
by a SU the more likely it is to be located as the adversary
can intersect the anonymization areas to narrow down SU ’s
location. Another limitation is that it cannot achieve high loca-
tion privacy without degrading the sensing performance of the
CRN . Indeed, the authors present a tradeoff between privacy
and performance as both cannot be maximized together.
Some works try also to preserve the location privacy of
users that participate in the crowdsourcing process, which
is used to recruit distributed mobile users to sense a given
channel around specific locations. For instance, Jin et al. [46]
formulate participants selection process as a reverse auction
problem where participants compete to perform spectrum
sensing tasks in return for rewards. Each participant’s true
cost for performing the sensing tasks is closely related to its
current location as explained in Section IV-A2. The authors
rely on the exponential mechanism to protect the location
information and prevent the attack that they have identified
(explained in Section IV-A2). Users are selected iteratively for
each sensing sub-task following the exponential mechanism to
guarantee differential privacy for their bids, and consequently
differential location privacy. While protecting location privacy,
this approach aims to minimize the social cost that represents
the sum of the real costs of users completing all the sensing
tasks. However, minimizing this cost deteriorates the location
privacy level, which is the main limitation of this approach.
4) Performance metrics and tradeoffs
a) Performance metrics
Computational complexity: This is an important metric as
SU s are usually resource constrained. Thus, it is paramount
to consider this when designing a location privacy preserving
scheme for CRN s. This metric usually accounts for the
overhead resulting from the various operations required by
the scheme (e.g., cryptographic operations) and incurred by all
different entities involved in the privacy preserving protocol,
and could be measured separately for each entity or as a whole
for the entire system. Computational complexity has a direct
impact on the delay that a SU may experience before getting
the decision about the spectrum availability. Computational
complexity is considered in most of the research works that
address the location privacy issue in cooperative spectrum
sensing in CRN , e.g. [11], [72], [224], [226], [227].
Communication overhead: Communication overhead is an-
other important metric that needs to be considered. Location
privacy preserving schemes must not overwhelm the network
by incurring high communication overhead that may lead to
the degradation of the overall system performance, especially
provided that bandwidth and/or energy resources are often
limited. Encryption, which most proposed solutions rely on
to ensure privacy, tends to incur, depending on the size of
ciphertexts, heavy communication overheads. Another factor
that also tends to contribute to this overhead is the number of
SU s involved in the cooperative sensing task.
Spectrum availability accuracy: It is important to protect
SU s’ location privacy, but while making sure that doing so
does not interfere with the cooperative sensing task. There-
fore, another important metric is the ability of these privacy
preserving schemes to perform the sensing task accurately.
This is quantified, for example in [72], using the detection
probability to capture the impact of the privacy preserving
scheme on detecting PU s presence.
Location privacy level: As the ultimate goal of any location
privacy preserving protocol is to preserve the location privacy
of SU s, it is then paramount to have a metric that can be
used to assess and quantify the privacy level. There are several
metrics that could be used for capturing this:
• Anonymity level: This measures the level of anonymity
provided by the cloaking algorithm and usually refers
to the size of the area to which a SU generalizes its
location to achieve anonymity. One way to quantify this
is by computing a relative measure normalized by the
anonymity level required by a SU . Kasiri et al. [72] rely
on a similar approach and define the location privacy level
of a specific SU as the ratio between the anonymized area
with respect to all PU s and the maximum anonymized
area of that SU . The privacy level for the whole network
is obtained by computing the average of the location
privacy levels over all SU s.
• Entropy: This shows how uniform the probability of
locating a SU at a specific position is and it is used to
measure the uncertainty level that an adversary has [234].
Li et al. [11] have used this concept to quantify the
location privacy level of their schemes. The area covered
by the CRN is divided into sub-regions, forming a set
G = {g1, g2, · · · , gm}. The uncertainty of the adversary,
and thus the location privacy level of a SU i involved in
the cooperative spectrum sensing, is then defined as:
A(i) = −
m∑
b=1
pi|b log(pi|b) (4)
where pi|b is the probability that SU i is located in
sub-region gb. The location privacy level for the overall
system is then given by A = ∑ni=1A(i), where n is
the number of SU s. If an attacker can uniquely infer
that SU i is located at sub-region gb, then pi|b = 1, i.e.
A(i) = 0. On the other hand, if the attacker is unable
to tell which sub-region SU is located in, which means
SU could be located at any region with equal probability
pi|b = 1/m, then the privacy level for SU i would be
A(i) = logm, which is the maximum privacy level it
can get when participating in the cooperative sensing.
• -differential privacy: This concept is based on the dif-
ferential privacy concept (discussed in Section III). A
mechanism M is said to provide -differential privacy
for a SU i if for any two sets of sensing reports,
R = [r1, · · · , ri, · · · , rn ] and R′ = [r1, · · · , r′i, · · · , rn ],
that differ only on i’s sensing report, we have:
| ln Pr[M(R) = O]
Pr[M(R′) = O] | ≤  (5)
for all O ∈ Range(M) with Range(M) is the set
of all possible outputs of M [225] . The privacy level
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is controlled by the parameter  with higher privacy is
ensured by lower  values. Very low values of  ensure
that Pr[M(R) = O] and Pr[M(R′) = O] are roughly
the same, meaning that the output O is not sensitive to
the changes of any single SU ’s sensing reports.
Location privacy could also be quantified using the concepts
of inaccuracy and incorrectness introduced by Shokri et
al. [234]. These concepts could be redefined to fit the context
of location privacy in CRN s as done in [235]. First, let Θ de-
note the observed sensory information that could be used to
localize a SU , and x and xc represent the location estimated by
the attacker and the actual SU ’s location, respectively. Let also
p(x|Θ) be the probability distribution of all possible values
of the target SU ’s location given the observed information.
Essentially, this probability models the adversary’s extracted
information from its observations.
• Inaccuracy: This is the discrepancy between the posterior
distributions p(x|Θ) and pˆ(x|Θ) which basically quanti-
fies the difference between SU ’s real location distribution
and the adversary’s estimated location distribution.
• Incorrectness: This is the distance (or expected distance)
between the true SU ’s location and that inferred by the
attacker. This metric is shown in [234] to be the most
appropriate for quantifying location privacy. The expected
distance, which is the adversary’s expected estimation
error, can be written as
∑
x pˆ(x|Θ)‖x− xc‖, where ‖ · ‖
is a distance, e.g. euclidean, between x and xc.
b) Performance tradeoffs
Several performance tradeoffs could be made when de-
signing location privacy preserving schemes for cooperative
spectrum sensing:
Scheme overhead vs. hardware cost: Scheme overhead in
terms of communication, computation, and/or energy could
be reduced at the cost of additional architectural compo-
nents. For example, Grissa et al. [227] introduce and rely
on an extra network entity to reduce both communication
and computational overheads while also improving privacy.
This reduction in overhead is achieved by means of this new
entity, introduced to carry out the private comparisons between
SU s and FC without disclosing RSS values. Without such
an entity, these comparisons would have been very expensive,
resulting in an excessive scheme overhead.
Privacy level vs. scheme overhead: Achieving higher
location privacy at the cost of deploying more expensive
cryptosystems with higher communication and/or computation
overhead is another tradeoff researchers often make. For
example, the works in [11], [224], [226] make such tradoffs
in order to improve the location privacy of their schemes.
Privacy level vs. sensing accuracy: Higher location privacy
can also be obtained at the cost of willing to degrade the
sensing performance of the CRN . For example, such a tradeoff
is made in the approach proposed by Kasiri et al. [72],
where the anonymization area, capturing the privacy level, is
increased but at the cost of decreasing the average detection
probability, representing the CRN sensing performance.
B. Location privacy in database-based spectrum discovery
Here, the location privacy issue is completely different
from that of the cooperative sensing-based CRN s. In fact,
as explained in Section II-A2, each SU is now required to
send its exact location to DB in order to learn about spectrum
opportunities in its vicinity. This makes preserving the location
privacy of SU s more challenging, since an adversary does
not need to perform any extra computation to estimate the
position, and the location information here could be easily
extracted from the query itself. Thus, location information
preserving schemes for database-based CRN s need to be
designed with two conflicting goals: i) hiding or not including
SU ’s location information in the query to be sent to DB , and
ii) in response to a SU ’s query, DB needs to inform SU about
spectrum availability in SU ’s vicinity. The second goal above
somehow entails that DB needs to know where SU is located
at, and thus, meeting these two conflicting requirements is
very challenging. As we will see later, this cannot be achieved
without making some performance tradeoffs.
1) Threat models
Several threat models are considered in the literature to
study and address SU s’ location privacy issue in database-
driven CRN s:
• Dolev–Yao threat model: The adversary, usually an in-
truder, can overhear, intercept, and synthesize any mes-
sage exchanged between SU s and DB . More specifically
the adversary can learn the location of an SU from
the query that the latter sends to DB to learn spectrum
opportunities. The adversary here is only limited by the
constraints of the used cryptographic schemes [228]. This
model has been considered in several works [54], [236].
• Semi-honest or honest-but-curious threat model: The ad-
versary, usually DB , follows the sensing protocol hon-
estly without changing any of its parameters, but shows
some interest in learning the location of target SU s [54],
[55], [181], [182]. This means that it responds to SU s
queries with correct spectrum availability information, but
at the same time tries to learn their whereabouts.
• Malicious-entity threat model: DB , or an intermediate
BS , may be malicious, i.e. they can change protocol
parameters to localize a target SU that is querying DB .
In some situations, the malicious entity could even be
a sophisticated adversary that has considerable resources
and has access to information from DB [237].
2) Location inference attacks
The most straightforward and basic attack is based on SU ’s
query content. A SU needs to include its exact location in its
query to DB . This makes it vulnerable to an intruder, that
can learn its location by eavesdropping its queries, or even to
DB that has access to these queries. Typically, DB ’s response
to a SU ’s query contains spectrum availability information;
e.g., the list of available channels in SU ’s vicinity and the
maximum allowed transmit powers in each of these available
channels. An adversary that has access to this information
could localize a target SU by overlapping the availability
areas of the different channels available at SU ’s location as
explained in Section II-A3b. This kind of attack assumes that
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the adversary has knowledge about the RF environment cov-
ered by DB as well as the activity and coverage of PU s. The
adversary can also exploit the fact that the allowable secondary
transmit powers are highly correlated to the relative distance
between a SU and a PU as discussed in Section II-A3b.
This has been exploited by Zhang et al. [55] to identify
a unified attack framework to localize both SU s and PU s
based on the MTP function introduced in [235]. The MTP
calculated by DB is divided into several levels based on the
distance between SU and PU . Specifically, when this distance
is less than a certain protection radius, SU is not permitted
to transmit on PU ’s channel. Beyond the protection radius,
SU can transmit at an increased power level as its distance
from PU increases until it reaches the maximum allowed
transmit power as regulated by FCC.
3) Location privacy preserving approaches
We summarize the approaches that are proposed in the
literature to cope with the location privacy issue in database-
based spectrum discovery in Table IV and we discuss them
in more details in the following. Generally speaking, most
existing techniques attempt to protect SU s’ location privacy by
adopting one of two techniques/concepts: k-anonymity [238]
or PIR (private information retrieval) [202].
As discussed in Section III, k-anonymity-based approaches
try to ensure that the probability of identifying the location
of a querying SU remains under 1/k, where k is the size
of the anonymity set to be received by the untrusted DB . k-
anonymity-based approaches are known to suffer from one ma-
jor problem: they cannot achieve high location privacy without
incurring substantial communication/computation overhead.
Furthermore, it has been shown in a recent study led by Sprint
and Technicolor [239] that anonymization based techniques are
not efficient in providing location privacy guarantees, and may
even leak some location information.
For instance, Zhang et al [55] rely on the k-anonymity
concept to provide a location privacy preserving mechanism to
protect the location privacy of both PU s and SU s. The pro-
posed scheme requires that each SU queries DB by sending
a square cloak region that includes its actual location instead
of just sending this location. SU keeps querying DB using
the same cloak region to avoid further location information
leakage. This scheme requires a tradeoff between high location
privacy and spectrum utility, which means that achieving a
high location privacy level results in a decrease in spectrum
utility. This limits the applicability of this kind of approaches
as they impact the main goal of CRN s which is optimizing
spectrum utilization efficiency. As discussed earlier, a good
approach should provide location privacy to SU s but without
hindering the functioning of CRN s.
k-anonymity is also used by Li et al. [182] to protect SU s’
location privacy during the commitment phase in which SU s
have to register the channels that they are planning to use as
explained in Section II-A3b. In this approach, SU s first send
their channel requests to the BS that they are associated with,
using pseudonyms that are randomly generated by a certifica-
tion authority. BS , then, queries DB on behalf of the querying
SU s using their pseudonyms. After that, DB performs hash
matching of SU s’ pseudonyms with a hash matrix provided
by the certification authority to verify SU s’ pseudonyms.
Subsequently, DB assigns a set of channels to BS based on
the latter’s location. BS then allocates the channels to its SU s
using a coloring model to prevent interference between them.
Finally, BS registers the used channel of each SU in DB by
including dummy information to provide k-anonymity to the
utilization information. This is done by registering more chan-
nels than the number of SU s’ requests to confuse attackers
and prevent them from using the utilization information to
localize SU s. Using BS to register the used channels helps
cutting off the relation between the registered channels and
SU s’ identities, which makes it harder for DB to associate this
information to corresponding SU s and, hence, localize them.
Thus, the proposed scheme can decrease the probability of
localizing SU s. However, it requires that BS is trustworthy or
it would not be able to protect SU s’ location. This assumption
is not usually realistic as it is hard to guarantee trustworthiness
in practice. It suffers from the fact that the probability of
localizing SU s increases as the number of switching events
increases or as the number of BS s decreases.
PIR-based approaches [54], [180], [181], on the other hand,
offer much better privacy than k-anonymity-based approaches,
but incur substantial computation and communication over-
head, thus limiting their practical use for CRN s [205], unless
used judiciously as discussed in Section III. For instance,
Gao et al. [54] propose a PIR-based location information
preserving scheme by adopting the PIR protocol of Trostle
et al. [240]. Instead of sending its location, SU hides its coor-
dinates within other locations and transforms this information
in such a way that SU is the only one that can revert it. Upon
receiving the blinded query, DB multiplies it with the spec-
trum availability information matrix and sends the outcome
back to SU . SU will be able to only retrieve the availability
information in its location using the secure parameters that
it used to transform the original query. SU is the only one
who knows the blinding factors and the transformation used
to transform the original query. Hence, only SU can recover
the spectrum availability information from the result sent by
DB . However, this approach suffers from large computational
overhead which is due to the use of the PIR protocol, known
to be expensive to execute as we highlighted earlier.
Grissa et al. [53] propose an approach that offers an
unconditional privacy to SU s within the DB ’s coverage area.
This approach uses set membership data structure, more pre-
cisely cuckoo filter [241], to send a compressed version of
DB to SU . In this scheme, SU only sends its characteristics,
but not its location, to DB , which it uses to adapt the content
of the cuckoo filter. After receiving the filter, SU constructs a
query that includes its location and a combination of other
parameters (e.g. band frequency, transmission power level,
etc) and queries the filter to check whether it contains the
constructed query. If it is the case, SU can deduce that
the channel is available and can use it by following the
parameters specified in the query. Otherwise, SU concludes
that the specified combination does not exist in DB and keeps
querying the filter with different combinations until it finds one
or reaches the filter’s capacity. Obviously, the main advantage
of this scheme is that it provides optimal location privacy to
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TABLE IV: Location privacy preserving schemes in database-driven spectrum opportunities discovery
Countermeasures Attacks Considered Techniques Pros Cons
Zhang et al. [55]
- Location inference from maxi-
mum transmission power
- Location inference from channel
switch
- Cloaking the query of SU within
a square region based on k-
anonymity
- Provides location privacy for both SU s and
PU s
- High location privacy degrades spectrum utility
Li et al. [182] - Location inference from spectrum
utilization information
- Intermediate base stations to for-
ward SU s’ queries to DB
- Intermediate base stations for
spectrum allocation
- k-anonymity for registering used
channels
- Adversaries cannot link usage information to
SU s
- Decreases SU s’ geolocation probability
- The probability of geolocating SU s increases
with the number of available channels.
- The probability of geolocating SU s increases
with the number of switching events
Gao et al. [54]
- Location inference from query
- Location inference from spectrum
utilization information
- Query blinding via PIR
- Spectrum mobility reduction
- Low communication overhead
- Reduces the localization probability of SU s
- High computational overhead
Grissa et al. [53] - Location inference from query - Sending portion of DB to SU us-ing cuckoo filter
- Very low computational overhead
- Provides ideal location privacy
- Large communication overhead if DB is huge
Troja et al. [180] - Location inference from query
- Collaboration between SU s
- private information retrieval
- Minimal number of PIR queries via collabo-
ration between SU s
- Takes into account SU ’s mobility
- Large communication overhead
- Relatively high computational overhead
Troja et al. [181] - Location inference from query
- Hilbert space filling curve index-
ing of DB
- private information retrieval
- Takes into account SU ’s mobility
- Minimal number of PIR queries via trajectory
prediction
- Relatively high computational overhead
Zhang et al. [237] - Location inference from query - Random obfuscation using Lapla-cian noise - Provides differential location privacy for both
SU s and PU s
- Increasing the location privacy level decreases
the utility of both PU s and SU s
SU s as opposed to the other approaches. However, it incurs a
relatively large communication overhead especially when the
size of DB is huge. The authors try to address this issue by
proposing to sacrifice one of SU ’s coordinates to considerably
reduce the size of the filter while providing reasonable privacy.
This is not needed when the size of DB is not large.
Troja et al. [180] propose another PIR-based approach to
protect the location privacy of mobile SU s. The PIR mech-
anism used in this work allows a SU to learn spectrum
availability in multiple-cell block containing its current cell.
As they move, SU s gradually develop a trajectory-specific
spectrum knowledge cache, via a series of PIR queries. SU s
within communication range of each other form groups and
interact in a peer-to-peer (P2P) manner to privately exchange
their anonymized cached channel availability information. This
reduces considerably the number of PIR queries as less SU s
need to query DB since they could learn opportunities from
SU s within their group. However, this still incurs large com-
munication cost and relatively high computational overhead,
especially when the group size is relatively large.
Troja et al. [181] propose another PIR-based privacy-
preserving protocol that relies on the Hilbert space filling curve
which is a continuous fractal that maps space from 2-D to
1-D [242]. DB is indexed based on this curve to address
SU s’ mobility which allows neighboring cells to be stored
in consecutive locations in DB . DB is split into multiple
disjoint segments which enables SU to retrieve channel avail-
ability information for a large number of consecutive cells
surrounding SU ’s location with a single PIR query. SU s use
trajectory information, known a priori or generated on the fly
via a prediction mechanism, to minimize the number of future
PIR queries as a SU can obtain availability information for
current and future positions in just one query. Despite its merit
in providing location privacy to mobile SU s with efficient
communication overhead, this approach incurs relatively large
computational overhead. The main advantages of this scheme
are that it considers mobile SU s and exploits trajectory
information to reduce the number of PIR queries to DB in
order to reduce overhead. However, it still suffers from one of
the well known limitations of PIR-based approaches, i.e. the
high computational overhead, despite its nice effort in reducing
the number of required queries.
Other approaches try to adapt the differential privacy con-
cept, explained in Section III, and apply it in the context
of database-driven CRN s. For instance, Zhang et al. [237]
propose an approach to protect bilateral location privacy of
both PU s and SU s. SU s obfuscate their location using a
two dimensional Laplacian distribution noise satisfying the -
geo-indistinguishability mechanism, derived from differential
privacy, introduced in [219]. The obfuscation depends on the
privacy preserving level that is decided by both SU s and
PU s by solving an optimization problem that maximizes their
bilateral utility. SU sends its obfuscated location along with
the privacy level which represents the maximum distance that
separates the sent location from the actual location. Based
on these parameters, DB decides about the transmit power
and radius or distance from PU that SU cannot exceed. The
main advantage of this approach is that it provides differential
location privacy for both PU s and SU s while allowing them
to adjust their privacy level to maximize their utility. However,
as this approach aims to maximize both the utility and privacy
level, which are always conflicting, increasing the privacy level
of both PU s and SU s often results in decreasing their utility,
and striking a balance is challenging.
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4) Performance metrics and tradeoffs
a) Performance metrics
Computational complexity: Making sure that these
schemes do not require heavy computation at both ends,
SU and DB , is crucial to the design of such schemes. This is
important merely because these SU devices, again, are usually
resource constrained (in both energy and CPU), and the appli-
cations running on them may not tolerate delays. In addition,
it is highly desirable not to overwhelm DB by involving it in
heavy computations, which can lead to congestion. Several
works (e.g., [53], [54], [180], [181]) use this as a metric
for assessing the effectiveness of their proposed approaches.
For example, Troja et al. [181] captures the computation
overhead by measuring the average cumulative response time
that their proposed scheme leads to. This time includes the
query generation time at SU , the processing time at DB , the
network transfer time, and the resulting extraction time at SU .
Communication overhead: Another crucial performance
metric is to assess how much network data the proposed
scheme generates. This assesses whether adding a privacy
preserving scheme would inundate the network and degrade
its performance. Indeed, a large communication overhead may
introduce a considerable delay that may leave the spectrum
availability outdated and cause interference to PU s if SU s
decide to use channels based on this outdated information.
Location privacy level: In addition to the privacy concepts
already discussed in Section IV-A4a, the following can be used
to assess the privacy level of any given scheme.
• Localization probability: This is basically the probability
that a SU is geolocated successfully by an attacker
under a given scheme. It may be influenced by different
parameters, e.g. the number of channel switching events,
the number of BS s in the network, etc. Some approaches
like [182] have considered this metric to evaluate their
approach’s privacy level.
• Size of possible location set: This measures the granular-
ity of the location that an attacker can infer about a SU .
A privacy preserving scheme fails completely to protect
the location of a SU if the size of this set is equal to 1,
which means that the attacker has succeeded to determine
the exact cell in which SU is located [54].
b) Performance tradeoffs
Location privacy vs. spectrum utilization: This tradeoff
consists on sacrificing some utility to provide high location
privacy guarantees. This means that seeking a higher privacy
level will necessary reduce the utility in question. For instance,
Zhang et al. [55] make a tradeoff between the location privacy
of both SU s and PU s, and spectrum utilization. SU s and PU s
can adjust their privacy levels to maximize their utilities. In
this case, increasing the location privacy level would decrease
the spectrum utilization and vice versa.
False positive rate vs ideal privacy: Some approaches,
like [53], use set membership data structures to construct a
compact representation of DB and make SU s query it for
spectrum availability. However, this kind of data structures,
despite its efficiency in compacting large sets of data, could
introduce some false positives when it is queried. This means
that the result of query may reveal that a channel is available
while in reality it is not. Some data structures, like the
cuckoo filter used in [53], give the possibility to control
this rate. Minimizing this rate will, however, increase the
communication overhead. So the tradeoff here is to allow some
false positives in the filter to guarantee ideal privacy to SU s.
C. Summary
In this section, we discussed the location privacy issues
in the spectrum opportunity discovery component for both
cooperative spectrum sensing-based and database-driven spec-
trum discovery. We detailed the different threat models and
attacks that target the location information of SU s. We then
presented the different approaches that are proposed in the
literature to deal with these issues. Finally, we explained the
different performance metrics that are or could be used to
assess the efficiency and the privacy level of location privacy
preserving protocols in CRN s. In the following section, we
will follow the same structure and reasoning to discuss the
location privacy issues in the remaining CRN components.
V. LOCATION PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN OTHER
CRN COMPONENTS
In this Section, we investigate SU s’ location privacy issue in
the remaining CRN components of the cognition cycle. Unlike
the spectrum opportunity discovery component, much less
attention has been given by the research community to the lo-
cation privacy issue in these components. The design goals of
privacy preserving schemes for each of these components are
then to address the sources of location information leakages
discussed in Section II-B (spectrum analysis), Section II-C
(spectrum sharing), and Section II-D (spectrum mobility).
A. Threat models
The same threat models that we have discussed previously
in the spectrum opportunity discovery phase apply to the
remaining components of the cognition cycle. Thus, we skip
these threat models here and we refer the reader to Sec-
tions IV-A (cooperative spectrum sensing) and IV-B (database-
based spectrum opportunity discovery) for more details.
B. Location inference attacks
Some of these attacks may target SU ’s location during
the dynamic spectrum auction process. For instance, Liu et
al. [155] identify an attack that exploits two sources of leakage,
highlighted in Section II-C3c: bid channels and bid prices. The
first attack uses bid channels (i.e. channels that are bid for by a
SU ). As explained earlier, a SU bids only for channels that are
available for it, i.e. SU belongs to the complement area of each
corresponding PU ’s coverage. Hence, a malicious auctioneer
can use the SU ’s available set of channels, obtained from the
SU ’s bids, to decrease its possible location range by inter-
secting the complements of the corresponding PU ’s coverage
areas as shown in Figure 11. The second attack exploits the bid
prices, which depend on the quality and characteristics of the
spectrum known to be highly correlated to SU ’s location. It
could be used after the first attack to further narrow down
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Figure 11: An example of the attacks identified in [155] which
first estimate the position of an SU to be in the intersection of the
available areas of channels 1, 2 and 3. Then, the attacker further
narrows down the estimated area by picking the cell having the
smallest distance between the exact channels’ qualities and those
estimated from bid prices.
the possible location area of the target SU . A higher bid
price means that the SU perceives a high spectrum quality,
and hence, the auctioneer can estimate the channel quality
perceived by a SU from the SU s’ bid price information. Since
an attacker can easily have (or can reasonably be assumed to
have) access to the statistics of channels’ qualities in each cell,
it can then compute the distance between these exact channels’
qualities and those estimated from bid prices. The cell with
the minimum distance corresponds then to SU ’s location with
high probability, as depicted in Figure 11.
Other attacks may exploit the spectrum utilization infor-
mation to localize SU s as explained in Section II-D. Gao
et al. [54], for example, identify an attack that infers SU s’
location in database-driven CRN s by exploiting the channels’
utilization information. The first component of the proposed
attack arises from the fact that a SU cannot access a PU chan-
nel if the PU is present, and hence, if a SU is active in
the presence of a PU , then the SU must be outside the
PU ’s coverage area. This gives the attacker a clue that the
SU is located at the complement of the PU ’s coverage area.
If the CRN covered area is modeled as a grid, as shown in
Figure 12, the adversary keeps incrementing a score, initially
initialized to 0, for each cell that belongs to an available area
of a specific channel. The location of the target SU will be
the cell with the maximum score, which represents the area
where all available areas of the channels overlap as illustrated
in Figure 12. The second component of the proposed attack
relies on the fact/event that a SU plans to switch from some
channel chnk1 to another channel chnk2 when PU k1 returns
to its channel. In this situation there are two possible scenarios:
First, when PU k2 is also present and is using its channel
chnk2 . In this case, since SU cannot interfere with PU k2 ,
the attacker can learn that the target SU is situated in the
PU k1 coverage area and the complement of PU k2 coverage
area. Second, when PU k2 is absent. In this case, the adversary
can learn that SU must be within the coverage area of PU k1 ,
as it must have switched to chnk2 after PU k1 ’s return. This
same attack is also used by Zhang et al. [55] as a second
component of their attack framework.
Figure 12: An example of the attack identified in [54] which uses
the complement of the coverage area of each transmitting PU to
gradually localize an SU by incrementing a score for each cell
situated outside the coverage area of each PU . The inferred location
willl be the cell with the highest score.
Physical-layer information based attacks are also possible
during the spectrum sharing process. In fact, an adversary can
directly extract position-related parameters like RSS , AoA,
ToA, etc, from SU s’ signals and exploit them to locate SU s,
as explained in Section IV-A2. As an example, this kind of
attacks is considered by Zhang et al. [236].
C. Location privacy preserving approaches
Few works have addressed the location privacy issue in
spectrum sharing and mobility but none, to the best of our
knowledge, have addressed this problem during spectrum
analysis phase. These works are summarized in Table V.
1) Spectrum sharing
Some approaches try to prevent the location information
leakage by hiding sensitive information exchanged during
spectrum auction, e.g. location, bid channels, and bid prices,
as discussed in Section II-C. Liu et al. [155] propose an
approach that aims to preserve the location privacy of the SU s
that participate in spectrum auction. This approach consists of
two main components: The first component enables SU s to
submit their encrypted locations and bid prices, while allowing
the auctioneer to construct the conflict graph (explained in
Section II-C1a) and determine the maximum bid price. This
is done using HMAC [243] and the prefix membership verifica-
tion scheme proposed in [244]. The second component enables
the auctioneer to launch the auction using a greedy spectrum
allocation algorithm to allocate the spectrum among SU s and
a charging algorithm to securely determine the winning bids
with the help of a trusted third party. Despite its merit in
reducing the effectiveness of some of the attacks presented in
Section V-B, and increasing the location privacy of SU s by
hiding the bid prices and channels, this scheme suffers from
some limitations. First, it relies on a trusted third party which
is not always realistic. Second, it cannot achieve high location
privacy without degrading the auction’s performance.
Other approaches try also to prevent physical-layer based
attacks during spectrum sharing, where attackers can capture
the target SU s’ transmitted signal when they try to access the
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TABLE V: Location privacy preserving schemes in spectrum sharing and spectrum mobility
Countermeasures Attack Considered Techniques Pros Cons
Liu et al. [155] - Location inference from Bid
channels and prices
- Prefix membership matching
- HMAC
- Efficient in thwarting attacks that use bid prices
- Defends to some extent against attacks that
exploit bid channels
- Requires a trusted third party
- Requires a tradeoff between location privacy
and auction performance
Zhang et al. [236] - RSS -based PHY-layer attack - Random power perturbation - Mitigates a PHY-layer attack which is usually
hard to thwart
- High location privacy level incurs significant
degradation of network throughput
Gao et al. [54] - Location inference from spectrum
utilization information
- Spectrum mobility reduction
- Low communication overhead
- Reduces the localization probability of SU s
- High computational overhead
- The localization probability of SU s increases
with the increase of channel switches.
spectrum and use it to extract position related measurements
like RSS , ToA, AoA, etc, as explained in Section II-A3a.
For instance, Zhang et al. [236] try to prevent attackers from
measuring RSS and using it to localize SU s following some
of the approaches presented in Section IV-A2. The authors
propose to rely on a random power perturbation approach
where SU s perturb their power transmission level to obfus-
cate their RSS values measured at the adversary side. This
perturbation consists of reducing the transmission power to
prevent an attacker from correctly estimating SU s’ positions.
They also provide a design of a socially-aware spectrum
sharing algorithm that can operate well together with the
power perturbation based privacy protection approach. The
main advantage of this scheme is that it tries to address a
physical-layer attack that is usually hard to prevent. However,
the main shortcoming of this approach comes from the fact
that the higher the privacy level, the more significant the
degradation of network throughput. This means that using their
scheme to preserve the location privacy of SU s would degrade
system performance.
2) Spectrum mobility
Spectrum mobility necessarily involves the usage of differ-
ent spectrum bands over time and as SU s move. However, as
explained in Section II-D2, spectrum utilization information
can become a serious source of location information leakage
especially when the number of used channels increases. Gao et
al. [54] propose a technique to prevent this in database-driven
CRN s by relying on two observations: The first is that higher
location information leakage takes place during the channel
switching process; i.e., when SU switches from one channel
to another. This means that if there is a way to make a SU only
switch to a channel that it has already used previously, then
this would not give extra information that could be exploited
by the adversary. The second is that SU s that choose the
most stable channels are less likely to switch channels. Based
on these two observations, each SU constructs a list that
stores its used channels and a prediction list that contains the
prediction of the duration of channels availability. SU chooses
a channel from the first list, containing the usage history, if
it is available. Otherwise, SU uses the second list containing
the predicted availability duration of each channel to make
sure that it picks the one with the best estimated duration, i.e.
the most stable. Despite its merit in reducing the localization
probability of SU s, this approach does not completely thwart
the attack based on SU ’s spectrum mobility. It just reduces the
action space of the adversary which is still able to approximate
SU ’s location when it tunes to other channels. Hence, as the
number of channel switching events increases, the localization
probability increases. In addition, it suffers from a relatively
high computational overhead.
D. Performance metrics and tradeoffs
1) Performance metrics
Computational complexity: This is again an essential
metric that needs to be used to evaluate any proposed scheme.
It has already been discussed in previous sections.
Communication overhead: This is also an essential metric
due to bandwidth constraints in CRN s, and has also been
discussed in previous sections.
Privacy level: The approaches used here are very similar to
the approaches stressed in the previous sections. For instance,
Liu et al. [155] rely on the previously discussed concepts of
uncertainty and incorrectness (see Section IV-A4a) to assess
the privacy level of their proposed scheme. Another metric
could be the number of used channels as it is important to
minimize the frequency of SU s’ switching events to avoid
attacks relying on the channel utilization as explained in
Section V-B. So, the number of used channels could be seen as
a suitable metric to evaluate how a privacy-preserving scheme
performs in preventing such attacks as done in [54].
2) Performance tradeoffs
As in the spectrum discovery phase, designing location
privacy preserving protocols for spectrum analysis, sharing
and mobility may require some tradeoffs between providing
location privacy and maintaining some utility. For exam-
ple, Zhang et al. [236] consider making tradeoffs between
achieving high location privacy and maintaining high network
throughput. Indeed, increasing the location privacy level using
their approach, as explained in Section V-C, is equivalent to
increasing the perturbation level on the transmission power of
SU s to prevent the adversary from accurately localizing them.
However, as the perturbation level increases, and so does the
privacy level, the network throughput decreases, hindering thus
the CRN performance.
E. Summary
In this section, we discussed the location privacy issues
in the spectrum analysis, spectrum sharing and spectrum
mobility components. We detailed the different threat models,
location inference attacks, and location privacy preserving
approaches that are proposed in the literature to protect the
location privacy in CRN s with a focus on the aforementioned
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components. Finally, we explained the different performance
metrics that could be used to assess the efficiency and the
privacy level of location privacy preserving protocols in these
components. In the following section, we will discuss some
of the open research problems and challenges with respect to
the location privacy in CRN s.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
There are still open research problems that could be further
investigated when it comes to location privacy in CRN s. The
following is a list of some of these challenges.
Location privacy in spectrum analysis: Location privacy
issues arising during the spectrum analysis process have
received little attention by the research community in spite
of, as discussed in Section II-B, the several vulnerabilities
and sources of location information leakage this process has.
Much work still needs to be done when it comes to investi-
gating inference attack models that can exploit these sources
of leakage, as well as developing countermeasure solution
protocols that tackle those inference attacks. For instance, an
attack framework could combine information like topology,
connectivity, interference and REM to localize SU s, since this
information could be accessible during the spectrum analysis
process as highlighted in Section II-B. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing works have exploited these
vulnerabilities, nor did they try to defend them.
Location privacy in spectrum sharing and mobility:
Not many approaches in the literature have addressed the
location privacy issue in these components of the cognition
cycle despite the amount of information that could be leaked
during spectrum sharing and mobility as stressed in Sec-
tions II-C & II-D. This is still an open issue that requires
further efforts from the research community.
Location privacy in distributed cooperative sensing:
The research efforts on providing location privacy to SU s
in cooperative spectrum sensing have focused on centralized
approaches but little has been done to address this issue for
distributed cooperative sensing. Little work has been done in
this regard (e.g. [72]); this research area is still not mature
enough and requires further investigation.
Location privacy with malicious adversaries: Most of
the existing location privacy preserving protocols in CRN s
consider attack scenarios that assume no collusion between
the different network entities; for example, in the context of
cooperative spectrum sensing, it is almost always assumed that
there is no collusion between FC and some SU s. However, it
is not unrealistic to assume that different entities can collude
with one another to infer location information, especially
that collusion often leads to better inference. Techniques that
address colluding attackers still need to be developed and
investigated, as not much has been done in this regard.
Location privacy for crowdsourced spectrum sensing:
Crowdsourcing is an emerging tool that is gaining lots of
interest in the context of CRN s. It enables the discovery of
spectrum opportunities in regions with insufficient presence of
SU s. In such cases, one can rely on other users (not necessary
SU s) to assess which and whether other channels are available,
mainly through an open call kind of process. To participate,
these other users can be encouraged through various types
of incentives (e.g., monetary, credit, etc.). In the context of
CRN s, crowdsourcing suffers from location privacy risks that
may expose the whereabouts of participating mobile users.
Dealing with this issue is still an open problem and only a
few works in the literature have dealt with it [46].
Location privacy of PU s: This is another direction that
is worth investigating, as the location of PU s could be
of paramount importance, especially in the case of military
incumbent systems that have stringent requirements in terms
of security and privacy. Also, CRN solutions that rely on the
cooperation of PU s may fail or poorly perform if PU s are
concerned about their location privacy. Addressing the location
privacy of PU s is still in its infancy, and more still needs to
be done [55], [235], [237], [245].
Location privacy in emerging CR-based technologies:
Emerging CR-based technologies [246] may bring additional
location privacy challenges on top of the ones that we have
discussed in this paper. For instance, in cognitive radio-based
cellular networks [247]–[249], multiple base stations may
localize or track SU s as they move across different cells.
The relatively small size of the cells in this kind of networks
could make it easier to localize SU s. In CRN -enabled smart
grids [250]–[252], smart meters act as SU s and opportunisti-
cally search for the available spectrum to transmit their data.
The location privacy concern here is quite different as it does
not involve tracking a user but can lead to identifying his own
personal address if a smart meter is localized. The location
information when augmented with power consumption data
sent by the smart meters can further reveal the presence
or absence of home owners and could lead to burglary for
example. Another emerging CR-based technology is cognitive
radio sensor networks (CRSN ) [253], [254] where the sensor
nodes are required to sense the environment and also the spec-
trum. Depending on the spectrum availability, sensor nodes,
acting as SU s, transmit their readings in an opportunistic
manner to their next hop cognitive radio sensor nodes, and
ultimately, to the sink. As the sensor nodes exchange their
sensing results of both the spectrum and the environment
with other nodes, this presents considerable threats to the
location privacy of these nodes and makes CRSN inherit the
location privacy issues of both WSNs and CRN s. All of
these technologies share similar privacy threats but also have
their unique vulnerabilities as well. Thus, there cannot be a
one-fits-all solution to address the location privacy in these
technologies, and further research efforts need to be made to
investigate and address issues that are specific to each of these
technologies.
Location privacy in multi-database-driven CRN s: As
FCC has already approved several companies to adminis-
trate, operate and manage spectrum databases, leveraging the
existence of these multiple databases (which are inherent to
spectrum database-driven dynamic spectrum sharing) opens up
a new class of very promising, spectrum access techniques
that can guarantee the protection of users’ location privacy
information yet without incurring significant overhead. This
area has not been explored yet, and research efforts need to
be made to investigate the potential of such an approach.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this survey, first, we have investigated SU s’ location
privacy issues in CRN s by exploring each functional com-
ponent and identifying its inherent vulnerabilities. Then, we
have discussed when and why generic and well known pri-
vacy enhancing approaches cannot be applied off-the shelf to
provide location privacy for SU s. After that we have explored
existing attacks and approaches for providing location privacy
solutions in the different CRN components. Finally, we have
highlighted some related open research problems that require
future investigation and attention.
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